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Introduction 
On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of Arizona’s 
immigration enforcement policy in Arizona v. United States. Deciding the constitutionality of 
Arizona Senate Bill 1070, the Court found three of the provisions federally preempt while 
allowing one provision to stand based on its facial constitutionality. The decision and its 
rationale favored the arguments and authority of the federal government’s supreme power in 
immigration enforcement.1 However, at the announcement of the decision, both parties declared 
victory.2  How is it possible that both parties declared victory when the Court favored one party 
in its decision? This thesis will explore this surprising reaction to the decision and the decision’s 
significance to the future of the trend of state immigration enforcement.  
On the issue of unauthorized immigration, the nation divides into two opposing sides, 
resulting in significant differences and a federal immigration policy stalemate. Congressional 
legislative history of the last few decades demonstrates a burden placed upon the states to 
address the growing unauthorized population. Frustrated with the federal government’s 
reallocation of the burden to the states and its inability to address the unauthorized population 
through enforcement, the states decided to assume more responsibility in state immigration 
enforcement.  
The doctrine of attrition through enforcement, originally a theory suggested for federal 
authorities, claims that strict policies and strict enforcement of those policies can actively deter 
foreign nationals from residing illegally in the nation.3 If the government eliminates incentives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Arizona et al. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
2 Julia Preston, “Arizona Ruling Only a Narrow Opening for Other States”. The New York Times, June 25, 2012 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/justices-decision-a-narrow-opening-for-other-states.html 
2 Julia Preston, “Arizona Ruling Only a Narrow Opening for Other States”. The New York Times, June 25, 2012 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/justices-decision-a-narrow-opening-for-other-states.html 
3 Mark Krikorian, “Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement.” Center for 
Immigration Studies Backgrounder 6, (May 2002). 
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for unauthorized immigration, making the risk of living with undocumented status worse than the 
benefit, then, foreign nationals will choose not to live illegally in the United States. By instituting 
policies that deter unauthorized immigrants from residing in the country, then the government 
can actively decrease the population of unauthorized aliens by creating an environment that 
incites self-deportation. States adopted the attrition through enforcement doctrine as a means to 
deal with the growing unauthorized population and the associated burden placed on the states by 
the federal government. 
As early as 2006, states began enacting policies intended to deter unauthorized 
immigrants from residing in the state, creating a trend of state policies encapsulating the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine.4 With the passage of SB 1070 on April 23, 2010, Arizona 
advanced the state attrition through enforcement trend to the national stage; Arizona became the 
vanguard state in this trend.5 While states adopted these measures, Arizona’s political 
environment led the state to push the boundaries of state authority to deter unauthorized aliens.6 
Yet the question arose: can states act in this manner to purposely drive unauthorized immigrants 
from their borders?   
Arizona SB 1070 escalated the trend to national attention, by enacting controversial 
provisions that completely encapsulated the intention of deterring unauthorized immigrants from 
the state. The bill, less commonly known as Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act, created criminal penalties as deterrents, which asserted the authority of state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Gillian Johnston and Ann Morse, “2010 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (January 1 - 
December 31, 2010).” Immigrant Policy Project. National Conference of State Legislatures, January 2011. 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/2010-immigration-related-laws-and-resolutions-in-t.aspx 
5 Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 49th Legislature (2010).  
6 Keith Aoki and John Shuford. “Welcome to Amerizona – Immigrants Out!: Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and 
“Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and Considering Whether “Immigration Regionalism” is An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come”. Fordham Urban Law Journal 38, no. 1 (2010): 6. 
	   6 
and local officials in investigating immigration status and enforcing immigration policy.7 
Arizona designed all the provisions to act as disincentives for aliens to live in the state. Four 
controversial provisions raised the state attrition through enforcement trend to the forefront of 
both immigration policy and the balance of powers in the federal system. The three struck down 
provisions allowed warrantless arrests when a state authority believes an individual committed a 
deportable crime and created criminal state penalties for residing in the state illegally, applying 
or holding a job without proper immigration status. The only provision to be found 
constitutional, known as “show me your papers”, granted state authorities, upon the reasonable 
suspicion of unauthorized status at a legal stop or detention, the ability to investigate 
immigration status by asking for documentation.8 If the individual did not have the proper 
documentation, then the authorities could detain them until their immigration status was verified. 
This legislation placed the trend upon a precipice, a defining moment where the nation became 
divided on the trend, with some states emulating Arizona’s approach, while others protested it. 
When Arizona brought the issue of unauthorized immigration to the forefront of the 
battle of power between states and the federal government, it seemed that this contentious issue 
would finally be decided. Yet, the escalation of Arizona SB 1070’s controversial methods of 
deterring unauthorized immigrants from its borders divided the nation, resulting in the 
announcement of victory from both parties.9 With the decision of Arizona SB 1070, the trend 
rested on a precipice: state adoption of the controversial trend could either be accepted or 
rejected by the Court. Thus, the decision ought to be considered the fulcrum of the state 
immigration policy trend of attrition through enforcement. The pivotal point of the trend, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Arizona Senate Bill 1070 
8 Arizona et al. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
9 Preston, “Arizona Ruling Only a Narrow Opening for Other States”. 
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decision, could either allow the doctrine to flourish, supported by the Constitution or cause its 
demise by failing to find the measures constitutional.  
When questions of authority on the governing and enforcement of policies concerning 
unauthorized immigrants arise, it seems that the Court must decide where the power lies, with 
the federal government or with the states. Yet upon the announcement of the decision, both 
parties claimed victory. How could both parties claim victory in a case where little compromise 
existed? This counterintuitive result raised questions about how the decision will be interpreted 
by the lower courts and state legislatures in the future. How will the precedent affect the state 
attrition through enforcement trend? This thesis will explore the rise and fall of state immigration 
enforcement, demonstrating the role of Arizona v. United States as the fulcrum of the trend.  
The significance of the case derives from the Court’s establishment of the standard 
necessary to determine the constitutionality of similar attrition through enforcement provisions. 
In doing so, the Court allowed the centerpiece of the attrition through enforcement doctrine − the 
“show me your papers” provision − to stand, although temporarily. At the “heart” of both this 
provision and the doctrine lies the intention to invoke fear of identification and deportation in 
unauthorized immigrants in order to deter them from the state. In upholding this provision, the 
Court upheld the core of the attrition through enforcement doctrine. Although the Court favored 
the federal government in its decision, its tentative permission of the provision incites questions 
of whether the constitutionality of the attrition through enforcement trend will persist.  
The question then becomes, how did the states respond to the Court’s decision? Despite 
their initial declaration of victory, state legislatures interpreted the ruling as an obstacle to the 
continued existence of the doctrine. Thus, Arizona v. United States, the key ruling on the state 
attrition through enforcement trend, with the additional influence of the results of the 2012 
	   8 
Presidential Election, led states to largely cease attrition through enforcement efforts. By 
examining these outcomes, Arizona v. United States’s role as a fulcrum in initiating the demise 
of the state attrition through enforcement trend becomes evident.  
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Chapter 1: 
The Commencement of the Attrition through Enforcement Doctrine in State Immigration Policies 
 
“The federal government has failed us, so we, the elected officials of small-town America, are 
getting tough with illegal immigration” - Lou Barletta, Mayor of Hazleton, Pennsylvania10 
 
Since at least the most recent immigration reform that regulated unauthorized status in 
1986, federal legislation and inaction has placed an increasing burden on the state, a burden that 
drove states legislatures to enact their own immigration policies. Arizona’s controversial SB 
1070 elevated the trend of state immigration policies of attrition through enforcement to the 
national stage. To remedy federal failure to enforce immigration policies, states like Arizona 
developed a doctrine of deterring unauthorized aliens from settlement. While many states and 
localities adopted these restrictive policies, SB 1070’s extreme measures made the trend 
constitutionally significant. As a pioneer of state immigration policies using attrition through 
enforcement, Arizona SB 1070 proves significant to the balance of state and federal power in 
immigration policy. 
In order to understand the significance of Arizona SB 1070, its context of federal inaction 
and state burden must be understood. This chapter will first discuss federal efforts to reform 
immigration in recent years, illustrating the burden placed upon state and local governments both 
by federal legislation and federal inaction. It will then demonstrate how federal action 
contributed to states’ attrition through enforcement strategy, culminating in Arizona SB 1070. 
Federal Failure to Positively Affect Unauthorized Immigration  
Since Congress’s last successful effort to address undocumented immigration in 1986, the 
unauthorized population has substantially expanded, from 3.2 million in 1986 to 11.1 million in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “freeSpeech: Lou Barletta”. CBS Evening News. CBS Broadcasting Inc. July 2, 2010. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500903_162-2099190.html 
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2011.11  As the unauthorized population expanded and the federal government failed to act, the 
population’s burden on state governments grew. As federal immigration efforts failed to 
disincentivize unauthorized immigration, the doctrine of attrition through enforcement gained 
traction as a plausible solution to the federal problem.  
With each effort to reform immigration, Congress allocated the responsibility of 
providing funding to the states. Yet, the enforcement of the programs and procedures remained 
solely within the jurisdiction of the federal government. These enforcement measures 
consistently failed to address the issue of the unauthorized immigrant population. States grew 
frustrated as they took on financial responsibilities for unauthorized immigration, while the 
federal government failed to implement effective enforcement measures. With the issue of 
unauthorized immigration growing in significance as the years went on and the population grew, 
the need for immigration reform strengthened, along with the tension between the federal 
governments and the state governments. 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 initiated the trend of placing a 
significant burden upon the states in funding immigration-related matters.12 Critically, the act 
banned the legalizing population of undocumented immigrants from receiving federal assistance 
for five years, assuming states would satisfy the funding and resource needs of the population for 
that period. While the federal government allotted $1 billion per year for four years to 
compensate states, this amount failed to be sufficient.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: 
Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem., CRS Report RL33874. (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, December 13, 2012), 2. 
12 The Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub.L. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
13 Cooper, Betsy; O’Neil, Kevin. “Lessons from the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.” Policy Brief. 
Migration Policy Institute, Vol. 3. (August 2005), 7. 
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Adding to this challenge, congressional efforts to restrict immigration into the United 
States since the last comprehensive effort in 1986, in effect, incentivized unauthorized 
immigration. Foreign nationals previously eligible for lawful entry into the country became 
ineligible, making unauthorized immigration the only option for a large population of people.  
The Immigration Act of 1990 amended some of the requirements for naturalization and 
immigration admission, even further narrowing the eligible population.14 This restrictive policy 
incentivized unauthorized immigration among those who previously would have been eligible to 
migrate legally.  
 In 1996, Congress passed two significant acts, which placed a great financial burden on 
state and local governments by restricting federal benefits from unauthorized aliens. The Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), placed restrictions on 
unauthorized aliens’ eligibility for legal status and federal benefits based on their previous 
undocumented status.15 This act prevented many unauthorized immigrants from receiving 
benefits such as Social Security.16 Further limiting abilities and benefits to unauthorized 
immigrants, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
restricted federal benefits for immigrants, both legal and undocumented.17 By enacting these 
measures, the federal government placed the financial responsibility squarely onto the states, 
without assistance. States could choose to deny immigrant aid, in line with federal regulations, 
but they would bear the social consequences. This transfer of responsibility is critical to 
Arizona’s argument that federal immigration reform placed a significant burden on state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The Immigration Act, Pub.L. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). 
15 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Division C of Pub.L. 104–208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546, (1996). 
16 Ibid. 
17 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub.L. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105, (1996).  
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governments. Thus, with this legislation, the unauthorized immigrant population’s burden on the 
states grew.  
The economic impact on state governments fails to be proportional to the impact of 
unauthorized immigration nationally. While some scholars argue that the net financial effect of 
immigration on the federal level is positive, for states with large undocumented populations, the 
fiscal effect is negative in the short- term.18 Federal mandates that require that states provide 
public services such as education, emergency health care, and legal protections, regardless of the 
resident’s ability to pay, place a financial burden upon the states.19 A state must provide 
unauthorized aliens with emergency health care and these other services, but may not enforce 
immigration policies based on the alien’s undocumented status. Although the federal government 
has some programs for reimbursing the states, reimbursements make up a tiny fraction of overall 
costs. The federal government retained primary authority of enforcement in immigration 
policies. This pattern became a serious concern to state governments’ as the federal government 
demonstrated its legislative and political inability to effectively enforce immigration, leaving the 
states with the continuous obligation to finance the growing unauthorized population. 
While federal legislation placed a greater financial burden and responsibility on the 
states, federal policies also established more of a cooperative role for states in immigration 
enforcement. The aforementioned IIRIRA, enacted in 1996, constructed the program known as 
287 (g). 287 (g) trains state and local officials to perform immigration law enforcement 
procedures.20 This program grants states and their officials far more authority in immigration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Smith, James P., and Barry Edmonston, eds. The New Americans: Economic, demographic, and fiscal effects of 
immigration. Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, (1997). 
19 “The Impact of Unauthorized Immigrants on the Budgets of State and Local Governments.” Congressional 
Budget Office. Congress of the United States. No. 2500, December 2007, 1. 
20 “Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act.” U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Department of Homeland Security. 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm 
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policy, establishing a more cooperative relationship between federal and state authorities in 
immigration enforcement. With a similar aim, another program utilizes cooperation between 
federal, state and local officials to better identify more unauthorized immigrants for immigration 
enforcement. Established in 2008, Secure Communities prioritizes immigrants for removal with 
federal, state, and local authorities cooperating in the process.21 As federal immigration efforts 
realized little benefit, more recent efforts attempted to increase effectiveness by cooperating with 
state and local officials. These cooperative efforts raised states’ hopes that states could play some 
role in mitigating the financial burden of the unauthorized population.  
Unauthorized immigration grew over the years to become a more daunting and politically 
divisive issue. With each passing year, the unauthorized population grew and the financial 
burden on the state grew due to new federal legislation. The year 2007 marks Congress’s last 
attempt to reform immigration in order to address the undocumented population. Years of 
discussion over the need to reform immigration after the 1986 immigration reform failed to 
decrease the unauthorized population led to pointed discussions in 2006 and a legislative bill in 
2007. Yet this effort, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform of 2007, failed due to political 
rifts within the ruling party, as the bill failed to receive enough votes to continue the legislative 
process.22 A bipartisan effort fervently promoted by a Republican President failed, based on a 
lack of support from the Republican Party.23 In response to this federal failure, state 
governments, including Arizona, began introducing and enacting immigration reform. This trend 
of attrition through enforcement policies, to be discussed in detail later in the chapter, utilized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 “Secure Communities.” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Department of Homeland Security. 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ 
22 Pear, Robert; Hulse, Carl. “Immigration Bill Fails to Survive Senate Vote.” The New York Times, June 28, 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/washington/28cnd-immig.html 
23 Ibid. 
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provisions granting state officials’ significant and unprecedented authority in immigration 
procedures regarding unauthorized immigrants.  
The coupling of the states’ increased burden and the federal government’s inability to 
effectively legislate or to enforce legislation gave little assurance to states that the issue of 
unauthorized immigration could be properly addressed in the future. Congress’s inability to 
compromise served as a catalyst for state government activism in enacting immigration policies. 
For state governments, the present could not yield a different result and the future would be too 
long to wait while the issue rapidly worsened.  
Attrition through Enforcement Doctrine 
 States legislators faced a predicament that seemed to lack a solution: the growing 
unauthorized population placed an increasing financial burden upon the states, yet the states 
lacked any means to change the accelerating pattern. From this situation, the doctrine of attrition 
through enforcement, first proposed as a national level, began to be adopted on a state and local 
level. The strategy of attrition through enforcement aims to deter unauthorized immigrants from 
settlement through a variety of policies. Possible policies include: mandating documentation, 
identification at stops, criminalizing employment, criminalizing illegal settlement, and other 
policies aimed to create a greater risk than incentive to reside in a state as an unauthorized alien.  
Immigration expert and Executive Director of the Center of Immigration Studies, Mark 
Krikorian, introduced the theory to the realm of state legislation in 2005. Attrition through 
enforcement aimed to steadily reduce the population of unauthorized immigrants in the nation, 
decreasing the unauthorized population to what Krikorian called “a manageable nuisance, rather 
than today’s looming crisis.”24 Recent years demonstrate a continual increase in the unauthorized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Krikorian, Mark. “Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement.” Center for 
Immigration Studies Backgrounder 6, (May 2002), 1. 
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immigrant population; thus this doctrine of deterrence called for an “end to the climate of 
impunity for border-jumping, and illegal employment, and fake documents, and immigration 
fraud.”25 A disdain for the federal government’s inability to address the problem of unauthorized 
immigration clearly appears in the affirmation of the doctrine by Krikorian, its explicit creator.  
In order to address the ever-increasing unauthorized population, attrition through 
enforcement legislation focuses on “self-deportation.”26 The desired effect of the doctrine relies 
on deterring the settlement of new unlawful aliens through increasing deportations and, “most 
importantly, by increasing the number of illegals already here who give up and deport 
themselves.”27 Already these types of policies, which disincentivize unauthorized immigration, 
deter settlement; proponents recognizing this results aim to utilize the effects of these policies to 
deter unauthorized immigration on a grander scale.28 In accordance with Krikorian’s theory on 
how best to combat the unauthorized immigration population’s growth, legislation must include 
robust promises of enforcement.29  
Krikorian argues that the doctrine already plays an implicit role in federal immigration 
policy such as the Real ID Act.30 Furthermore, while the theory’s implementation in legislation 
may prove unpopular with some, the majority of voters will support its intention due to the 
sentiment against unauthorized aliens. As middle-class America “supports the legal immigration 
and expresses disgust” with unauthorized immigration, this doctrine employs this distinction to 
garner political support.31 This argument promoted by Krikorian foreshadows the controversy 
that sprang from its codification in state immigration policies. Significantly, Krikorian framed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid, 5. 
26 Ibid, 3. 
27 Ibid, 1. 
28 Ibid, 3. 
29 Ibid, 4. 
30 Ibid, 1. 
31 Ibid, 6. 
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the doctrine as a new angle that ought to be explicitly adopted by the federal government, not 
necessarily state governments.32 Therefore, Krikorian’s initial argument failed to account for the 
complications of enacting attrition through enforcement state policies, rather than federal 
policies. 
 The attrition through enforcement doctrine translated to state legislation through the need 
for states to enact policies within their authority to affect the unauthorized immigration problem. 
Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach can be hailed as a key player in applying the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine to state legislation, as a prominent author in both Alabama and 
Arizona’s major attrition through enforcement laws. Kobach advocates for the attrition through 
enforcement policy in the absence of Congress “taking the necessary steps” to address the 
unauthorized immigration problem.33 Pointing to states’ implementation of E-Verify to 
demonstrate the state’s ability to affect change in the unauthorized immigrant population, he 
demonstrates how states can change the reality of unauthorized life in the country, which would 
“dramatically alter behavior” making “the only rational decision to return home.”34 According to 
Kobach, a nationwide strategy ought to be implemented in order to radically alter the current 
unauthorized immigration situation.35 In the absence of federal action, states adopted attrition 
through enforcement. Essentially, states legislatures acted because the federal government failed 
to act.36  This doctrine’s adoption by the states blazed new ground for state sovereignty and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid, 6. 
33 Kris Kobach, “Attrition through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration”. Tulsa Journal 
Comparative and International Law 15, No. 155 (2008): 160. 
34 Ibid, 157. 
35 Ibid, 163. 
36 Ibid, 163; Yet in practice, the adoption of the attrition through enforcement doctrine by states amounted to 
millions of dollars and significant resources utilized in order to defend these policies in the courts.36 With such 
extensive political ramifications experienced by many several states and localities, the question arises as to the true 
motive of the states’ adoption of the doctrine in their immigration policies. If federal inaction is the core reason for 
the states’ adoption of the doctrine, than the experience of towns and states’ political and legal consequences ought 
to have led states to utilize a different method.36 Yet, since political controversy and legal backlash failed to deter 
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assertions of state power on a federal issue.  
State Movement 
In spite of the “media scrutiny, bruising debates, and legal uncertainty”, state and local 
legislators addressed the unauthorized immigrant population by actively pursuing the attrition 
through enforcement theory.37 In an effort to deter the presence of aliens and increase the 
authority of state officials, state legislation created criminal sanctions for acts previously only 
determined civil violations.38 Many states utilized this tactic of criminalizing acts of 
unauthorized immigrants, specifically the criminalization of seeking employment, failing “to 
carry an alien registration document”, and entering the county illegally, such as Arizona, 
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah.39 By creating state criminal violations, 
states increase the severity of the charges; both disincentivizing unauthorized immigration and 
increasing the potential for more severe penalties.  
An extraordinary amount of laws, this only marked the beginning of a dramatic shift in 
state governments legislating in an area where the federal government had failed to reform or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the trend, this implies that another catalyst of the doctrine proves to be critical.  
 The adoption of the attrition through enforcement doctrine resulted in “a crisis in race relations” between 
Latino immigrants and mostly white natives, the doctrine’s continuation and escalation in state immigration polices 
suggests that a factor in the adoption of the doctrine is to affect the race of the state. 36 This suggestion receives 
support via the prominent policy actor, Kris Kobach’s work with FAIR, Federation for Immigration Reform. FAIR 
founder John Tanton, claimed the intention of the organization as the preservation of  “a European-American 
majority, and a clear one at that.”36 While subtler suggestions of racial factors occur, the greatest indication of the 
racial undertone of the attrition through enforcement’s adoption by states lies in its persistence even after its 
demonstrated effect of racial conflict, and, as the Director of the Southern Poverty Law Center states, “a trail of 
tears.”36 Regardless of whether the suggestion of racial factors purposefully undertone the doctrine’s application to 
state immigration policies, states’ intended effect is attrition through enforcement in order to significantly decrease 
the burden of the unauthorized immigrant population. (Potok, Mark. “Trail of Tears”. When Mr. Kobach Comes to 
Town: Nativist Laws & the Communities They Damage. Southern Poverty Law Center: 2011.) 
37 Tichenor, Daniel J; Filindra, Alexandra. “Raising Arizona v. United States: Historical Patterns of American 
Immigration Federalism”. Lewis and Clark Law Review 16, no. 4. (2012): 1215-1247, 1218. 
38 Congressional Research Service. State Efforts to Deter Unauthorized Aliens: Legal Analysis of Arizona’s S.B. 
1070, by Kate M. Manuel, Michael John Garcia, Larry M. Eig. CRS Report R41221. Washington, DC: Office 
of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 14, 2010, 3. 
39 Meyer, Brooke; Morse, Ann. “2011 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (Jan. 1–Dec. 7, 
2011).” Immigrant Policy Project. National Conference of State Legislatures, January 2012. 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx; Arizona Senate 
Bill 1070, 49th Legislature (2010).  
	   18 
enforce the law.40 In 2010, the year that Arizona enacted Senate Bill 1070, more than 1,400 bills 
were introduced in 46 legislatures and the District of Columbia, and 346 laws were enacted.41 In 
comparison, state legislatures in 2005 only enacted 39 laws and resolutions affecting 
immigration in total.42 Since 2005, with a significant escalation of the trend in 2007, state 
legislatures introduced and passed a far greater amount of immigration policies, predominantly 
with an intended effect of attrition through enforcement.  
Figure 1. State Immigration Legislation and Resolutions 
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40 Tichenor, Daniel J; Filindra, Alexandra, 1244. 
41 Johnston, Gillian; Morse, Ann. “2010 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (January 1 - 
December 31, 2010).” Immigrant Policy Project. National Conference of State Legislatures, January 2011. 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/2010-immigration-related-laws-and-resolutions-in-t.aspx 
42 Morse, Ann. “A Review of State Immigration Legislation in 2005.” Immigrant Policy Project. National 
Conference of State Legislatures, January 2007. http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/immigrant-policy-
project-state-legislation-117.aspx 
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Figure 2. States and Immigrant-Related Legislation 
 
National Conference of State Legislatures 2010 
This influx of state policies highlights the inefficiency of federal policy, as states enacted 
their own legislation to address the federal problem of unauthorized immigration. Rather than 
continue to deal with unsatisfactory policies, states attempt to seize authority on this matter by 
increasing their power through legislation. Such a significant increase in state legislation 
challenges the decades-long stalemate on immigration policy. Finally, immigration reform 
progressed; however, states produced these immigration reforms, not the federal government. 
As the movement among the states to deal with unauthorized immigrants grew, Arizona 
became the model for strict, comprehensive legislation, which tested the authority of state 
sovereignty on immigration policy. Arizona, with its omnibus legislation Senate Bill 1070, led 
the state legislation movement of employing its police powers. 
Codification of Cooperation? 
Yet, an argument exists which claims that the attrition through enforcement doctrine 
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adopted by the states merely codifies the cooperation of federal and state officials in immigration 
enforcement. The federal government through legislation such as 1996’s IIRIRA implemented 
cooperation between federal and state officials. Analogous to many other federal policy 
problems, federalism, as a state trend advocating shared responsibility, is a “familiar solution to 
the problem” when the federal government seemingly fails to enforce implementation of 
policies.43 The attrition through enforcement policies of states simply internalized these policies 
into their legislation. 
 According to prominent immigration policy scholars, Daniel J. Tichenor and Alexandra 
Filindra, state and local government historically have held a prominent role in influencing and 
enforcing immigration policies, even as immigration policies presume to belong solely in the 
federal field.44 States retained the ability to enact de facto immigration legislation in order to 
affect immigration without “overstepping their restricted constitutional role.”45 This argument 
claims that the application of the attrition through enforcement doctrine in state policies only 
continues this historic and constitutional role of the states.46  
Furthermore, the federal government enlisted this authority of state officials through its 
federal policies. In passing the IIRIRA in 1996, the federal government created an important 
program of cooperation, 287(g).  This program afforded state officials formal training in 
immigration policy, akin to the training of federal agents in order to allow local offices to work 
in tandem with officials of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.47 States claim that their 
attrition through enforcement policies simply codify the cooperation between federal and state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Varsanyi, Monica W., Paul G. Lewis, Doris Provine, and Scott Decker. "A Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: 
Immigration federalism in the United States." Law & Policy 34, no. 2 (2012): 138-158, 139. 
44 Tichenor, Daniel J; Filindra, Alexandra, 1247. 
45 Newton, Lina; Adams, Brian E. "State immigration policies: Innovation, cooperation or conflict?." Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 39, no. 3 (2009): 18. 
46 Tichenor, Daniel J; Filindra, Alexandra. 1215. 
47 Magaña, Lisa. "Arizona’s Immigration Policies and SB 1070." Latino Politics and Arizona’s Immigration Law SB 
1070. New York: Springer, (2013): 19-26, 22. 
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authorities already established by the federal government.48 These policies, such as those enacted 
in Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma, ought to be characterized by cooperation rather 
than conflict with federal programs, according to this argument.49 While the states found a 
different means to assert authority in immigration policy, this may not necessitate instigation of a 
conflict with the federal government.50 
Proponents of federal power respond that this argument neglects the importance of the 
cooperation occurring upon federal terms. States and localities obtaining the ability to enact their 
own laws on how the state will cooperate with federal authorities create variation in federal 
officials’ relationship with the state and local officials.51 An even more critical consequence than 
differing relations between each state and the federal government, the relationship between 
immigrant communities and the government would differ in each locality and each state, creating 
a “patchwork” of immigration laws.52 This variation in treatment of unauthorized immigrants 
unarguably fails to be the intention of the federal government offering state and local 
government cooperation in federal immigration policies.53 Thus, the argument that the trend of 
state immigration policies simply codifies the cooperation permitted by the federal government, 
abandons the objective of federally legalized cooperation, clearly deviating from the result of this 
trend.  
States adopted the doctrine of attrition through enforcement in order to affect the 
burdensome issue of unauthorized immigration. Recent federal efforts in reforming immigration 
only resulted in an increased burden to state governments and a substantial increase in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Newton, Lina; Adams, Brian E, 19. 
49 Ibid, 19. 
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unauthorized population. In pursuit of addressing this growing problem, state legislatures 
embraced the attrition through enforcement doctrine and implemented a dramatic number of 
immigration policies, in the hopes of deterring unauthorized immigrants from their states. While 
many states participated in this trend, the subsequent chapter will demonstrate Arizona’s pivotal 
role in both manifesting the attrition through enforcement doctrine in legislation and elevating 
the trend to constitutional significance.  
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Chapter 2: 
Arizona SB 1070 as the Fulcrum of the State Immigration Policy Trend 
 
The trend of state immigration policies utilizing the attrition though enforcement doctrine 
accelerated into the national immigration policy debate through Arizona SB 1070. Enacted in 
2010, Arizona’s SB 1070 became the symbol of the attrition through enforcement trend as a 
brazen manifestation of the doctrine. As the vanguard of the state immigration policies using 
attrition through enforcement, Arizona’s SB 1070 proves significant to the balance of state and 
federal power in immigration policy. Its constitutionally controversial provisions capture the 
intention of the attrition through enforcement strategies as applied to state immigration policies, 
becoming the defining legislation of the state immigration policy trend.  
This chapter will demonstrate Arizona SB 1070’s role as the fulcrum of the attrition 
through enforcement trend of state immigration policies. By beginning with Arizona’s 
motivations for implementing this policy, the intentions of the legislation to enact the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine will become clear. Then the chapter will describe the controversial 
provisions within the act that raised preemption questions. Arizona SB 1070 represented a clear 
manifestation of the attrition through enforcement doctrine, such that its constitutional challenges 
serve as a test of the doctrine at the state level.  
Arizona SB 1070 Motivations  
 Arizona’s interest and activism in this arena stems from a variety of motivating factors, 
specifically its particularly high burden resulting from the federal government’s neglect in 
enforcing immigration policies. Arizona’s experience with unauthorized immigration is 
significant due to Arizona’s location as a state bordering Mexico. However, the federal 
government gave the least amount of assistance to Arizona for this geographical problem. In the 
early 2000’s, the federal government implemented a policy that strengthened law enforcement 
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measures at the Mexico border with California and Texas, but not Arizona. The federal 
government decided to rely upon the desert terrain to deter migrants from crossing the border in 
Arizona. The lack of border enforcement led Arizona to cope with the consequences of the 
“funnel effect” that the federal government created. 54 The year of Senate Bill 1070’s enactment, 
the unauthorized immigrant population in Arizona totaled 470,000, which accounts for 7% of the 
state population that year.55 Fending for itself due to federal inaction, Arizona believed the only 
way to solve its unauthorized immigration problem was to enact its own immigration policy.56  
In addition, the political and ideological characteristics of Arizona fostered its activism 
and influential status in the emergence of state immigration policies. Largely a Republican state, 
Arizona’s policies generally strive for conservative ideals. Strict immigration policies tend to 
gain the favor of the majority of the state. Rhetoric in Arizona among lawmakers classifies 
unauthorized immigration as a criminal problem akin to a natural disaster.57 In 2009, such 
conservative rhetoric found a louder voice when then Governor Napolitano became Secretary of 
Homeland Security allowing Republican Jan Brewer to become Governor.58 
 Another major character in Arizona is Maricopa County Sherriff Joe Arpaio, who became 
the face of Arizona’s extreme political and ideological motivations in immigration legislation. 
Since 2007, his office has forced the departure or deportation of over 26,000 immigrants, 	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“regardless of their legal status.”59 His threats to jail his protestors and his plans to send over 200 
deputies in a search for illegal immigrants stirred suspicion as to the genuine motives of the 
immigration legislation.60 The conservative personalities and outspoken comments of Arizona’s 
lawmakers drew attention to the bill, creating controversy by suggesting that the bill was 
politically motivated rather than a solution to a policy problem.  
Arizona SB 1070 as an Initiator of a National Dialogue on Attrition through Enforcement 
 Indeed, some scholars have argued that the federal burden placed on Arizona ought not to 
be considered the core motivation of Arizona’s enactment of SB 1070.61 In contrast to the notion 
that Arizona acted due to its need for enforcement resulting from federal neglect, some argue that 
Arizona utilized SB 1070 as “a pre-emptive strike” to move the national dialogue to the concept 
of attrition through enforcement.62 As state legislators increased the amount of legislation 
enacted to deter unauthorized immigrants between 2007-2010, the trend failed to draw much 
attention.63 Only as Arizona enacted SB 1070, the nation began a dialogue on state immigration 
policies and the attrition through enforcement doctrine, a result desired by Arizona, as it “seems 
to relish opportunities to push the boundaries in the state/federal relationship.”64 
 While the theory that the state immigration policy trend sprang from the federal failure to 
address the problem of unauthorized immigration applies to other states, arguably that rationale 
fails to apply to the case of Arizona.65 Rather, Arizona utilized the unclear messages of the 
federal government, and the trend toward state-federal cooperation, to push the boundaries of 
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state authority and sovereignty.66 Arizona seemed unmotivated by the federal failure in 
enforcement but instead utilized it as a rationale for its legislative actions. Scholars Meghan 
McDowell and Doris Marie Provine, both of Arizona State University, found that in an analysis 
of Congressional debates on immigration reform, Arizona failed to participate in discussions of a 
federal need to address enforcement or in debate over the unauthorized immigrant burden on 
states.67 As other states discussed the financial burden placed on states by the federal 
government, Arizona remained silent on this topic in comparison to other states that later would 
enact attrition through enforcement legislation. This evidence may signify that other 
characteristics in Arizona factored substantially into the enactment of the law.68 Arizona enacted 
a law “designed to make unauthorized immigration as unattractive as possible” based on a 
financial concern for the state; however, the congressional analysis conducted by McDowell and 
Provine suggests that the financial reason cannot be the main factor.69 Critical to the implication 
that the SB 1070’s enactment occurred for political reasons, each legislator who publically 
supported the act in Arizona received a notable increase in political support within the state.70 
Arizona’s failure to mention the stress of the federal burden before it enacted SB 1070 and the 
overwhelming political support of the legislation suggest that state politicians enacted SB 1070 
based on its political appeal.  
 This political appeal can be characterized by its assertion of state authority in a federal 
issue, particularly one involving the conservatively unpopular concept of unauthorized 
immigrants. Arizona’s conservative political ideology and penchant for asserting state 
sovereignty suggests that the desire to escalate the attrition through enforcement doctrine to a 	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national dialogue fueled SB 1070 enactment. As one state’s legislation can change the course of 
a national dialogue, this notion can be asserted as the accurate characterization of Arizona SB 
1070.71 Arizona SB 1070 intended to manifest the attrition through enforcement doctrine in 
legislation, by “discourag[ing] and deter[ring] the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and 
economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”72 While McDowell and 
Provine argue that Arizona’s political goals served as the sole motivation, both the financial 
burden and popular political conservatism motivated and manifested Arizona SB 1070.  
Arizona SB 1070 
Arizona SB 1070 embodies the doctrine of attrition through enforcement. At its passage, 
Southern Poverty Law Center characterized it as the “harshest law yet seen.”73 In this way, 
Arizona became the vanguard state for testing the legal limits of greater state involvement in 
immigration enforcement.74 This legislation elevated the trend onto an inevitable track leading 
straight to a United States Supreme Court decision. The legislation challenged notions of state 
authority in immigration enforcement as it went beyond then present scope of state powers. In 
essence, through this bill Arizona challenged the federal government to either allow the state 
significantly more authority to enforce immigration policy or to start actually enforcing these 
policies at the federal level.75 As the “discourse around immigration has been almost as powerful 
as the law itself,” Arizona’s SB 1070 embodiment of the attrition through enforcement doctrine 
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instigated a national conversation on immigration enforcement, a necessary and relevant 
conversation to the unauthorized immigration problem facing the nation.76 
The intent of the legislation, as stated within the bill, claims a compelling interest in 
enforcing federal immigration laws.77 Yet, the law grants authorization to state officials for 
actions previously reserved to federal officials. Arizona enacted this Senate Bill with the 
intention of codifying attrition through enforcement by “discourag[ing] and deter[ring] the 
unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the 
United States.”78 While the legislation proved to be nationally controversial, this intention of 
deterring unauthorized immigrants from the state, the attrition through enforcement philosophy, 
proved to be politically popular.79 
Controversial sections 3, 5(C), 6, and 2(B) clearly seek to affect the undocumented alien 
population through attrition through enforcement. By increasing the criminality of actions 
through additional sanctions or increasing the potential for being recognized as an unauthorized 
alien, these four provisions actively pursued the notion of attrition through enforcement.80 As the 
nation and the courts concentrated upon these four provisions, so will this analysis.  
Section 3 established a state violation, in addition to an existing federal violation, for 
trespassing on public or private land if the person is of unauthorized status. 81 Thus, this section 
creates a state penalty, for residing or traveling through the state without authorization. By 	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creating an additional penalty, the unlawfulness of the action increases, establishing more severe 
criminal sanctions. Such a penalty further deters unauthorized immigrants from residing in 
Arizona, where they will be subjected to greater sanctions than other states. Opponents claim that 
provisions such as these will create an intended effect of channeling unauthorized immigrants to 
other states, challenging other states to establish even more restrictive laws promoting “self-
deportation” 
Section 5(C) criminalizes the act of seeking employment in the state if unlawfully in the 
country.82 Seeking employment is defined in this section to be applying, soliciting or performing 
work as an employee or independent contractor. A provision targeting undocumented employees 
raised specific controversy in Arizona, as the state had previously enacted legislation 
criminalizing the employment of unauthorized immigrants through employer sanctions, a 
measure the Supreme Court found to be constitutional in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.83 As 
employment primarily motivates immigration to the United States, if the state refuses to employ 
unauthorized immigrants, then unauthorized immigrants hold little incentive to reside in that 
state.84 Thus, Section 5(C) aims to deter unauthorized immigrants by removing the main 
incentive of unauthorized immigration. 
Section 6 allows state officials to make a warrantless arrest “if the officer has probable 
cause to believe . . . [the individual] has committed any public offense that makes [him/her] 
removable from the United States.”85 Arizona asserts that most of this provision is already 
allowed, and that the additional authority to connect the crime to deportation will aid the state in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 AZ SB 1070, Section 5(C): “it is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the United States and who is 
an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an 
employee or independent contractor in this state”. 
83 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
84 Kobach, Kris. “Attrition through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration”. Tulsa Journal 
Comparative and International Law 15, No. 155 (2008): 156. 
85 Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 
	   30 
addressing repeat unauthorized offenders.86 By placing additional authority in the hands of state 
officials to arrest without warrants, Section 6 manifests the attrition through enforcement 
doctrine by creating additional danger of deportation for unauthorized immigrants and elevating 
the fear of removal.  
Most critically to the attrition through enforcement doctrine, Section 2(B) granted state 
officials the authority, “where reasonable suspicion exists” of an alien status, to determine the 
immigration status of that person.87 Commonly known as a “show me your papers” provision, 
Section 2(B) permitted state officials to seek the immigration status of any individual, thereby 
permitting the active pursuit of unauthorized aliens by state authorities. Since its enactment, 
similar provisions have been enacted by various states pursuing the same objective of attrition 
through enforcement. This controversial provision sparked the attention of the nation by 
capturing the heart of the attrition through enforcement doctrine. Subsections of the provision 
explicitly require state officials to follow federal requirements and statutes, ensuring the 
protection of unauthorized immigrants from discrimination.88 These requirements, however, 
failed to satisfy suspicions that the provision will allow for racial profiling.89 
Provision 2(B) seems to embody the intent of the attrition through enforcement doctrine 
by attempting to deter unauthorized aliens through the fear of being stopped by state officials.90 
While verifying immigration status already existed as an authority of officials once an individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Brief of Petitioners, Arizona et al. v. United States, No. 11-182 (2012). 42. 
87 AZ SB 1070, “for any lawful contact made by a law enforcement official or agency of this state or a county, city, 
town or other political subdivision of this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who 
is unlawfully present in the united states, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the 
immigration status of the person. The person's immigration status shall be verified with the federal government 
pursuant to 8 united states code section 1373(c)”. 
88 Arizona Senate Bill 1070. 
89 Eastman, John C. “Papers, Please: Does the Constitution Permit the States Role in Immigration Enforcement”. 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 35, no. 569 (2012): 569 – 592, 569. 
90 Eagly, Ingrid V. “Criminal Law and Immigration Law: Defining the Outsider: III. The New Institutional 
Dynamics of Immigration: Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070”. The Regents 
of University of California Law Review, 58 No. 1749 (2011): 1750 -1817, 1814. 
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was arrested, this provision expands the authority to any stop within the reasonable discretion of 
state officials.91 As this provision only allows state officials to request immigration documents 
from those stopped when there is a “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful residence in the United 
States, the provision relies on the assumption that unauthorized status in the United States can be 
deduced through a simple stop without relying on race or ethnicity. 
Importantly, the language of the provision expands the authority of officials from 
investigating the immigration status of those suspected of committing a crime, to anyone 
detained without any criminal suspicion, “such as passengers held in a traffic stop, or residents of 
a home or business held during the execution of a search warrant.”92 Necessarily, this provision 
provides significant discretion to the law enforcement officer in judging the likely immigration 
status of the individual.93 Section 2(B) places state officials in a position to determine 
immigration status, with a definite emphasis on finding those “not supposed to be here,” a notion 
that understandably created prevalent questions of the possibility of racial profiling. The 
discretion granted to state officials to determine immigration status sends a distinct message to 
unauthorized aliens that any detention, criminal or otherwise, will likely result in the recognition 
of their undocumented status and then procedures for deportation. Critically, the state believed 
this provision would deter unauthorized aliens from the state based on fear of recognition of their 
undocumented status. 
These provisions enacted in Arizona S.B. 1070, tested the legal limits of state sovereignty 
and its exercise of police powers. By granting additional authority to state officials and creating 
criminal violations, Arizona’s SB 1070 places the authority to regulate unauthorized immigration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Tichenor, Daniel J; Filindra, Alexandra. “Raising Arizona v. United States: Historical Patterns of American 
Immigration Federalism”. Lewis and Clark Law Review 16, no. 4. (2012): 1215-1247, 1245. 
92 Chin, Gabriel J; Miller, Marc L. “The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration through Criminal 
Law”. Duke Law Journal 61, no. 2 (2011): 251 – 314. 
93 Ibid. 
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in Arizona with Arizona officials. This assertion of state authority resulted in the Department of 
Justice filing suit to enjoin the legislation from enactment, claiming the provisions presented an 
unconstitutional interference preempted by federal law.94 This suit initiated the case that became 
the pivotal decision of Arizona v. United States.95   
State Immigration Legislation Trend Follows lead of Arizona SB 1070 
Arizona elevated the attrition through enforcement doctrine to national attention through 
its controversy and other states followed its lead. Thus, the decision on the Arizona legislation 
can be equated with a decision on the constitutionality of states’ adoption of the attrition through 
enforcement doctrine. The decision serves as a fulcrum for the state attrition through 
enforcement trend. As Arizona escalated the trend to assert state authority in immigration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Office Of Public Affairs, Department of Justice. “Citing Conflict with Federal Law, Department of Justice 
Challenges Arizona Immigration Law,” United States Department of Justice (July 6, 2010). 
95         The residents of Arizona experienced the most profound effect of the legislation. Both legal residents and 
undocumented immigrants fled the State in the time period between the law’s passage and its effect in July of 
2010. Stories of the experiences of Arizonians concerning the law’s effect consumed the news, showing people 
fleeing the borders of the state and the nation, uprooting their lives in an “expressed fear of being subject to 
suspicion, harassment, and arrest by law enforcement officials.” 
Arizona’s significant test of federal power received meaningful national controversy along with a suit filed 
by Department of Justice. Dissatisfaction and criticism came in a variety of means through various perspectives. 
Legal scholars from prestigious institutions articulated the facial unconstitutionality of the provisions in law 
reviews and also for the greater public in newspapers and blogs. These arguments supported the suit filed by 
Department of Justice, explaining that federal law preempts these state policies. These claims illuminated to the 
nation the constitutional questions and challenges facing the contentious bill.  
While these legal challenges became profound later in the consequences of the bill, initially the municipal 
boycotts demonstrated to great success the disapproval of the bill. As of May 2011, 11 major cities, including: 
Seattle, Washington; Boston, Massachusetts, San Francisco, California; Los Angeles, California; and Austin, 
Texas, boycotted Arizona by terminating official travel to the state and, most critically, authorizing the ability 
for present and future contracts with Arizona-based businesses to be terminated. Additionally, many national 
organization boycotted travel to Arizona in protest, including the League of United Latin American Citizens, 
National Puerto Rican Coalition, and Asian American Justice Center. Months after the bill’s passage, Arizona 
and Governor Brewer set to host the Border Governors Conference, attended by the border governors of four 
U.S. states, Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, and six Mexican states, Baja California, Sonora, 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. All six Mexican governors refused to attend the conference 
in an effort to protest the passage of S.B. 1070. 
By placing Arizona businesses in jeopardy and thus impacting the state’s economy, the criticism for the 
legislation attempted to negatively affect the state. As these boycotts occurred publically before the legislation 
went into effect, disapproving and influential municipalities attempted to force Arizona to reconsider its passage 
of SB 1070; however to no avail as the legislation came into effect as planned.  (Aoki, 8; Magaña, 25; Amended 
before the passage but did not omit controversial provisions before enactment HB 2162, AZ SB 1070).  
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enforcement, subsequent legislation in other states furthered this escalation by asserting more 
authority and enacting policies more narrowly aimed at deterring unauthorized immigrants.  
The introduction of copycat legislation became a major consequence of Arizona’s 
enactment of S.B. 1070; as of July 2010, only two months after the passing of SB 1070 five 
legislatures introduced similar bills.96 While states enacted less legislation than predicted after 
the conservative shift in the 2010 elections, this pattern continued in 2011 as 25 states introduced 
core elements of Arizona’s SB 1070’s controversial provisions.97 Undeterred by Arizona SB 
1070’s challenged constitutionality, other states enacted legislation, which required police to 
check the immigration status of criminal suspects, compelled businesses to check the legal status 
of workers using a federal system called E-verify, and forced applicants for public benefits to 
verify eligibility with documentation of their lawful presence.98 Even as preemption questions 
challenged Arizona SB 1070, similar attrition through enforcement laws modeled on Arizona SB 
1070 remained in effect in other states.  
 In contrast, some other states decided to reject the trajectory established by Arizona SB 
1070 by defeating copycat proposals. Strong grassroots organization, opposing law enforcement, 
business groups, and the potential negative fiscal impact of enacting anti-immigrant legislation 
deterred many states from enacting SB 1070-inspired legislation.99 Interestingly, the political 
support for Arizona SB 1070 began to waver after its initial strength among in the electorate in 
the 2010 elections. In 2011, Arizona voters recalled Russell Pearce, the sponsor of SB 1070, 
marking the first recall of a sitting state senate president in U.S. history.100 While these actions 
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97 “State Immigration-Related Legislation: Last Year’s Key Battles Set the Stage for 2012,” National Immigration 
Law Center, January 2012, http://www.nilc.org/states-wrapup-2011.html 
98 Tichenor, 1245. 
99 “State Immigration-Related Legislation: Last Year’s Key Battles Set the Stage for 2012,”. 
100 Ibid, 10. 
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seemingly contradict the trajectory created by Arizona SB 1070, these consequences conflict 
with the greater political momentum for the attrition through enforcement doctrine created by 
Arizona SB 1070.  
Even those states that did not pass similar immigration legislation claimed a stake in the 
decision of the doctrine’s constitutionality by demonstrating legal support of Arizona S.B. 1070 
by filing an amicus brief in support of Arizona’s effort. Fifteen states declared their approval of 
SB 1070, supporting Arizona’s state activism: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Idaho, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Virginia, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, South Carolina, 
and South Dakota.101 Upon the inspiration of Arizona’s SB 1070 five states - Alabama, Georgia, 
Indiana, South Carolina and Utah— enacted significantly similar legislation. 
Of particular interest to this analysis will be the omnibus legislation inspired by Arizona 
SB 1070 in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah. The effect of the Supreme 
Court’s decision on the constitutionality of Arizona’s SB 1070 will be best demonstrated through 
the decision’s effect on each state law. Before the decision, the constitutional challenges to 
Arizona SB 1070 led courts to halt the implementation of similar laws passed in Utah, Indiana, 
Georgia, and South Carolina.102 Yet, this failed to be the case in Alabama, as an Alabama federal 
district court allowed certain SB 1070 – like provisions to be implemented.103 While different 
states handled the legislation similar to SB 1070 differently, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 
5, all states awaited the decision of the legislation’s constitutionality. 
Lower Court Decisions: 
 The legal challenge to SB 1070 on the constitutionality of attrition through enforcement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and Fifteen Other States in Support of the Petitioners, Arizona v. United 
States No. 11-182 (2012).  
102 “State Immigration-Related Legislation: Last Year’s Key Battles Set the Stage for 2012.” 
103 Ibid, 2. 
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state policies began with a compliant filed on July 6, 2010 by the United States. In challenging 
the constitutionality of SB 1070, it filed a motion requesting the Court to issue a preliminary 
injunction to enjoin enforcement of the policies until the District Court ruling.104 In agreement 
with the United States argument that federal law preempts Arizona’s authority to enact the 
provisions of SB 1070, the District Court of Arizona on July 28, 2010 issued a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the implementation of the four contested provisions.105 
 On appeal of the decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, agreeing with the United States’ argument that the provisions’ implementation 
would interfere with federal authority and policies. Unanimously, the Appellate Court found 
Section 3 and Section 5(C) to be federally preempted; yet Justice Bea dissented from finding 
Section 2(B) and Section 6 to also be preempted by federal authority. This divide over 
interpretation led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to resolve these contested questions on 
federal preemption of state immigration policies.106 
The effect of allowing state immigration policies like SB 1070 would be fragmented 
national immigration policy and enforcement, a significant federal issue, which leads the federal 
government to challenge Arizona.107 The question arises as to whether state immigration 
legislation will lead to non-uniform immigration policy. This variation across states could cause 
complications or an inability for federal policy to have an effect, if competing with tens of 
different state policies. These federal preemption questions brought this state immigration policy 
trend and its attrition through enforcement doctrine to the attention of the courts. As Arizona SB 
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1070 anticipated a ruling by the Court, the state-level attrition through enforcement doctrine 
awaited a defining decision on its constitutionality. 	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Chapter 3: 
The Court Weighs In: The Supreme Court’s Decision on Arizona SB 1070  
 
The state strategy of attrition through enforcement reached its defining moment with the 
decision in Arizona v. United States. Before the decision, the state immigration policy strategy 
manifested as a constitutionally controversial trend. This doctrine pushed the boundaries of 
federal power, precipitating a federal challenge to its constitutionality. Through the enjoinment 
of Arizona’s SB 1070, the attrition through enforcement doctrine accelerated to the Supreme 
Court. By ruling upon the constitutionality of the four contested provisions of SB 1070, the 
Court, in essence, ruled upon the constitutionality of the attrition through enforcement approach 
in state immigration policies.  
In its decision, the court narrowly defined the applicable precedent, preemption tests, and 
standard resulting in three provisions being found unconstitutional and one provision upheld. 
Provision 2(B), the surviving provision, allowed the most controversial and fundamental 
component of the state attrition through enforcement policy to stand. The Court’s ruling in 
Arizona v. United States defined a standard on preemption questions to allow states to continue 
to utilize attrition through enforcement policies as long as the policies’ implementation remains 
constitutional. While this permission seems to constitute a victory for Arizona, it is the Court’s 
narrow interpretation of constitutionality and wary permission that leads the significance of the 
decision to favor United States arguments. It is evident from the decision that the Court 
perceived an inability to effectively strike down the attrition through enforcement doctrine this 
early into the implementation of these provisions, yet invites a challenge, which would permit 
the Court to find the doctrine unconstitutional in the future.  
 This chapter will demonstrate the legal significance of the Court’s holding and standard 
in order to illustrate how the Court intentionally granted temporary permission to utilize attrition 
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through enforcement policies. In order to better understand how the Court can interpret the 
preemption questions, this analysis will examine the two precedents utilized in the arguments by 
each side. Then, the analysis will evaluate the parties’ arguments on the provisions’ 
constitutionality. While Arizona stresses the precedent set in DeCanas and the police powers 
vested to the state governments, the United States emphasizes the precedent in Hines and the 
power of the federal government to override state policies in an effort to implement federal 
efforts.  
Upon the foundation of the contrast between the parties’ arguments and the divide in 
applicable precedents, the decision of the Court will be better understood as the fulcrum of the 
state immigration doctrine of attrition through enforcement. The majority defined the preemption 
tests to deem three of the provisions unconstitutional while upholding the constitutionality of the 
provision at the center of executing the attrition through enforcement doctrine. Justice Scalia 
fervently dissents, claiming that the Court ought to have found all the provisions constitutional 
based upon state sovereignty, along with other concurring/dissenting opinions. Yet, the 
significance of the case derives from the Court’s establishment of the standard necessary to 
determine the constitutionality of similar attrition through enforcement provision. In doing so, 
the Court allowed the centerpiece of the attrition through enforcement doctrine to stand, although 
probably temporarily. 
Past Court Decisions of Precedent 
By first understanding the Court’s prior decisions on pertinent matters, the decision’s role 
as a fulcrum in the role of state immigration policy will become clear. Two previous decisions 
constitute the relevant precedent in this case: Hines v. Davidowitz and DeCanas v. Bica. 
Interestingly, these cases must be differentiated in their application to the case, as each case leads 
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the ruling to favor a different party. Thus, the United States utilized the Hines v. Davidowitz in 
its argument, and Arizona advocated for placing an emphasis on DeCanas v. Bica. By 
understanding the holding of the two differing precedents, Arizona v. United States’ role as the 
determinative case in the Court’s handling of state immigration policies comes into view. 
In a decision expressed by Justice Black in 1941, Hines, et al. v. Davidowitz et al. 312 
U.S. 52 rejected the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Alien Registration Act.108 The Court 
found that the act, which mandated aliens to register each year by providing certain information 
and paying a fee was preempted by Congress’s enactment of a complete schema on alien 
registration.109 In an analysis of the respective powers of the state and federal government in the 
regulation of aliens, the Court acknowledged the importance of the federal duties to protect 
foreign nationals in international relationships.110 While the decision explicitly expressed its 
ruling as declining to create a clear formula for preemption question relating to immigration 
policies, the holding clearly expresses that any state law would interfere and thus be preempted 
by the superiority of federal law when the federal government enacts a complete schema on an 
issue within its authority.111 The holding in Hines expressed the authority of the federal 
government to provide uniformity in regulating aliens, thus preempting state policies.112  
Years later, a similar question on federal preemption of state immigration policies 
concerning aliens faced the Court. In 1976’s DeCanas et al v. Bica et al. 424 US 351, Justice 
Brennan expressed the affirmation of California’s Labor Code, which prohibited employers from 
knowingly employing unauthorized immigrants.113 Presented with the question of whether 
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federal authority on immigration matters preempts the statute, the Court ruled that the statute 
failed to constitute preemption.114 While holding that the power to regulate immigration 
exclusively belongs to the federal government, the decision also expressed state’s broad 
authority to “regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.”115 Since 
the state tailored the statute to address a particular and compelling problem and Congress had not 
enacted conflicting policies, the Court deemed the statute constitutional.116 The Court held that 
the decision in Hines remains consistent with this ruling by emphasizing the comprehensiveness 
of the federal policies relevant to Hines in comparison to the situation in this case.117  
Yet the Court failed to account for one critical distinction between its ruling in Hines and 
DeCanas. Among the important components of federal preemption in terms of immigration 
policy, Hines established that state immigration policies ought to be deemed federally preempted 
if they “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”118 DeCanas acknowledged this ruling, yet declared that this aspect of 
the Hines precedent failed to be applicable based on the lower court’s omission of the ruling in 
its analysis. As the lower court did not address this preemption test, neither should the Court in 
this case.119 However, it is this omission that proves to be the determining test of Arizona SB 
1070’s constitutionality; the Court had to determine whether Arizona SB 1070’s provisions of 
state authority interfere with the federal government’s ability to execute its purposes and 
objectives in immigration policy. 	  
Years later, the Court addressed this distinction in the ruling on Arizona v. United States. 
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The Court’s rationalization of these two conflicting precedents adds to the significance of 
Arizona v. United States as a fulcrum in the debate over state immigration policies’ attrition 
though enforcement doctrine. In order to rule upon SB 1070’s constitutionality, the Court must 
define these precedents to complement its opinion, thus choosing one interpretation that will 
either favor federal or state authority in regulating unauthorized immigrants. 
Arizona’s Arguments on SB 1070’s Constitutionality 
 Arizona’s argument and the argument for state attrition through enforcement policies are 
premised upon the current stalemate over immigration policy.  Given the federal government’s 
lenient enforcement, Arizona argued it should have the right to regulate unauthorized immigrants 
within its state boundaries.120 Based on the state’s significant unauthorized immigrant 
population, its respective financial burden, and the location of Arizona as a border state, Arizona 
argues that these factors prove to be a compelling reason to enact policies concerning 
unauthorized immigrants.121 Arizona utilizes the precedent established in DeCanas to support its 
argument for the provisions’ constitutionality; as DeCanas ruled in favor of states’ power in 
immigration enforcement policy, citing a lack of explicit interference in federal efforts.  
 Arizona utilizes the Court’s decision in DeCanas as supportive and applicable precedent. 
As expressed previously, the decision in DeCanas establishes the constitutionality of state 
policies regulating the employment of unauthorized immigrants.122 DeCanas expressed how the 
Court “has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a 
regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted.”123 Arizona employs this precedent to 
draw attention to the Court’s previous authorization of state policies regulating unauthorized 
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immigrants.124 As the Court expressed in DeCanas, Arizona argues that the power of the federal 
government to regulate immigration policy does not exclude the power of states to regulate the 
unauthorized immigrants within state borders.125 
 Another rationale employed by Arizona and those states that advocate for the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine relies upon the notion that the federal government has 
commissioned state immigration policies.126 Federal immigration laws explicitly require 
cooperation with state and local officials, through programs such as 287(g) and Secure 
Communities programs.127 1996‘s IIRIRA established 287(g) allowing state and local officials to 
perform immigration law enforcement procedures with adequate training and under a 
memorandum of agreement. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportation program, 
Secure Communities, piloted in 2008, partners federal, state, and local officials in order to 
compile a unified system of information on immigration status.128 Arizona held that these 
provisions only codified the already established relations between the states and the federal 
government in matters of immigration enforcement.129 The state asserted that the provisions in 
SB 1070 simply affirm the authorization and cooperation mandated by federal programs.130 As 
these provisions only affirm the cooperative role state and local governments play in 
immigration enforcement, federal law fails to preempt these state policies.131 
 Arizona’s major rationale in arguing that these provisions ought to be deemed 
constitutional relies upon an interpretation of the provisions to allow constitutional cooperation 	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and implementation.132 As these provisions do not require conflict with federal immigration 
policy, absent explicit preemption, these provisions ought to be upheld as constitutional. 133 
Simply, Arizona argues that these provisions only mirror or replicate the federal laws that foster 
federal and state cooperation. This idea is know as mirror theory, which claims that states hold 
the authority to enact laws, which simply reiterate federal laws. State inference in immigration 
enforcement heavily relies upon the mirror theory, the ability for states to mimic the legislation 
of the federal government, especially the legislation that permits state authority through 
cooperation. The attrition through enforcement doctrine relies upon states’ assertion of police 
powers and an “inherent authority to enforce immigration laws, both criminal and civil.”134 
Arizona argues against the contention raised by the federal government that these four provisions 
explicitly interfere with federal efforts, rather they argue that SB 1070 codifies cooperation 
between state and local authorities and federal officials.  
United States’ Arguments on Federal Government’s Preemption of contested provisions 
In contrast to those arguments, the United States Department of Justice argues that these 
four provisions would interfere with federal efforts, and thus federal law preempts these state 
policies.135 Emphasizing the unconstitutionality of SB 1070’s provisions, the United States 
stresses the comprehensive schema established in these fields of immigration policy, the 
precedent the Court established in Hines, and the federal government’s power to supersede state 
policies that interfere with federal efforts. 
According to the federal government, Congress has established a full and comprehensive 
schema on immigration policies and policies pertaining to unauthorized immigration through the 
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Immigration and Nationality Act.136 These regulations concern entrance and deportation but also 
the arenas applicable to SB 1070’s provisions, such as registration and employment, establishing 
an inclusive schema for government relations with unauthorized immigrants.137 Additionally, 
within the complete schema of immigration policies, the federal government granted state and 
local governments the opportunity to cooperate with federal authorities, in specific aspects of 
immigration policy, in order to more thoroughly address the unauthorized population.138 For 
these reasons, the United States argues that Arizona’s policies exceed the permissible state role 
in immigration policy as the federal government failed to allow cooperation in that area.139 As 
the federal government decided to allow cooperation with state and local officials in certain 
areas, their decision to not allow cooperation in the area that Arizona asserts authority signifies a 
choice made by the federal government to hold exclusive authority in that area.  
  The United States’ argument utilizes the precedent set by the Court in Hines, 
distinguishing it from the precedent in DeCanas. In the Hines decision, the Court held that any 
regulation of foreign nationals, such as unauthorized immigrants, implicates considerations of 
foreign policy, leading these powers to be granted to the federal government.140 Foreign policy 
implications favor the federal government’s power to address unauthorized population and deter 
the Court from placing these powers upon state governments. Using Hines as precedent, the 
respondents claim Section 2(B)’s preemption upon its stance as “an obstacle to the 
accomplishment” of federal requirements.141 
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The majority of the United States’ claims rely upon the explicit and implicit power of the 
federal government to address issues of immigration policy. While the notion that the federal 
government has the authority to regulate immigration remains uncontested, the United States 
asserts that this power necessitates the implicit authority to create a comprehensive schema to 
address all aspects of immigration including the government relationship with foreign nationals. 
Otherwise, differing state policies would undermine a unified national approach to immigration 
policy.142 If allowed, the United States claims that SB 1070 would rival the decisions and 
programs of the federal government in immigration policies, conflicting and interfering with 
federal effort.143 State assertion of authority in this arena is both unconstitutional and preempted 
based on its inevitable result of interference. Additionally, the police powers of states do not 
permit establishing laws addressing conduct regulated by the federal government; states cannot 
mirror federal policy in this arena.144 145 Thus, while the United States argues against Arizona’s 
authority to enact the contested provisions of SB 1070, the argument also repudiates the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine employed by states. 
Supreme Court Decision on Arizona v. United States 
On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court released its decision on Arizona’s contested 
SB1070 provisions.146 The Court’s ruling defines the constitutionality of state immigration 
policies, which utilize attrition through enforcement.147 In ruling on whether federal law 
preempts and thus renders invalid four provisions of SB 1070, the Court found three of the four 
contested provisions unconstitutional.148 Yet, the most critical component of the decision in 	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terms of its projected effect on attrition through enforcement relies on the Court’s rationale 
finding provision 2(B) constitutional.149 
 Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the opinion of the Supreme Court in Arizona v. 
United States 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), a 5 – 3 decision affirming and remanding the Appellate 
Court’s decision. Justice Elena Kagan recused herself due to past involvement in initial litigation 
of the case.150 The opinion found three of the four provisions to be unconstitutional based on 
federal preemption. The Court found Section 3’s state crime for unauthorized entry into the state, 
Section 5(C)’s crime for employment, and Section 6’s ability granted to state officials to make 
warrantless arrests to interfere with the either exclusive power of the federal government in the 
area or the execution of explicit federal powers. However, Section 2(B) passed constitutionality 
on its face, according to the Court, due to a lack of a demonstration of any conflicts with federal 
policy that would constitute federal preemption.151  
According to the Court, the federal government’s authority on immigration policy is both 
“well-settled” and an “undoubted power” due to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4 of the 
Constitution, which specifies the power of “establishing a uniform rule of naturalization” as an 
expressed power of Congress.152 As a fundamental component to overall foreign policy where 
immigration policies link to international relations, the Court finds it important to have nations 
communicate with one sovereign rather than 50 sovereigns.153 Yet, the Court recognizes that 
states hold a role in immigration policy, specifically when a state has a pervasiveness interest in 
immigration policy due to the disproportionate consequences of unlawful immigration in 
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Arizona in comparison to other states.154 The Court commences its decision by articulating the 
valid interests held by both parties. Thus, the contention in dispute narrows to whose authority in 
immigration policy pertaining to unauthorized aliens prevails over the other party.155 
The Court prefaces the introduction of the preemption tests by emphasizing the need to 
defer to the authority of the police powers of the State, unless there exists a “clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress” to grant authority to the federal government.156 In determining these 
questions, the Court employs preemption tests. The Court uses a two-prong test to resolve the 
constitutionality of provisions based on federal preemption. If a state statute fails either of these 
tests, federal law conclusively preempts the provision.157 Even though the Court makes explicit 
that these tests fall short of a comprehensive standard, the Court utilized the standard as 
applicable in this case and thus future similar cases.158 Firstly, federal law supersedes state 
efforts in fields, such as immigration, where the federal government “maintains exclusive 
governance.”159 This provision prohibits state laws that regulate in a field completely occupied 
by the federal government. Secondly, federal law preempts state laws when they conflict, 
interfering with federal efforts and authority.160 The Court’s determination of the applicable 
preemption test is critical to the understanding of the role this decision plays in the never-ending 
debate between the powers of the federal and state governments. By understanding how these 
three provisions failed the two-prong preemption standard, and how Section 2(B) remained 
constitutional under the test, the boundaries of preemption can be better understood.  
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In its analysis of Section 3, the Court determined that in actuality the provision “adds a 
state-law penalty for conduct proscribed by federal law.”161 The redundancy of the provision is 
found to be superfluous where Congress occupies the entire field of alien registration.162 Using 
the precedent of Hines, “even complementary state regulation” constitutes preemption of federal 
law and thus is impermissible.163 By covering an entire field, as Congress has done with alien 
registration, the federal government clearly intended “ to preclude States from complementing or 
enforcing additional regulation.”164 To the Court, Section 3 fails tests of federal preemption by 
making a federal crime into a state crime, an unnecessary addition of enforcement that fails to 
add additional enforcement, but adds state penalties for a crime sufficiently equipped with 
federal penalties. 
Through a different aspect of the two-prong preemption standard, the Court found 
Section 5(C) unconstitutionally preempted by federal policy. The provision “enacts a state 
criminal prohibition where no federal counterpart exists.165 By establishing a criminal penalty for 
an act under the jurisdiction of immigration policy, historically governed by the federal 
government, “Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who 
seek or engage in unauthorized employment” based on its omission from the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986.166 If the state places a criminal penalty on the act, it would 
“involve a conflict in the method of enforcement.”167 By deciding not to impose criminal 
penalties for those unauthorized immigrants who seek obviously unauthorized employment, 
Congress deemed the action exempt from a criminal penalty, preempting states from placing the 	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action with a criminal penalty. Due to the obvious decision of Congress to omit this criminal 
penalty from legislation, Section 5(c) fails the two-prong standard, resulting in its 
unconstitutionality.  
The last provision found to be preempted by federal law was Section 6, which, as 
interpreted by the Court, attempts to “provide state officers even greater authority to arrest aliens 
on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given to trained federal immigration 
officers.”168 As understood by the majority, this would allow the State to “achieve its own 
immigration policy.”169 This provision fails the preemption standard as it authorizes state 
officials to have the discretion entrusted to the federal government.170 State officials would be 
able to unilaterally enforce immigration policy without any input or approval from the federal 
government.171 The Court finds Section 6 to be preempted by federal law as it fails the legal 
standard since Congress has clearly instituted a policy where “state officers may not make 
warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability.”172 For this, Section 6 of Arizona’s 
SB1070 creates an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of federal policies, therefore clearly 
conflicting with federal law.  	  Distinct from the three unconstitutional, federally preempt provisions, the Court 
determined the final contentious provision, Section 2(B), passed federal preemption tests. 
However, the Court explicitly provides a critical disclaimer stating the Provision 2(B)’s 
constitutionality may be tested further if its implementation fails to be as constitutional as its 
text.173 Due to the anti-discrimination statutes both federally and for the state, the court did not 
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address the possibility of discrimination based on racial profiling or any other factor in the 
identification component of the “show me your papers” component of the provision. Rather the 
Court addressed the aspect of the provision, which involves federal, state, and local authorities 
working together. In addition to the “show me your papers” component of the provision, the 
provision instructs that “no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way 
restricted, from sending to or receiving from ICE information regarding the immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful of an alien in the United States.”174 The Court interprets the provision, on its 
face, to provide for alternatives in order to avoid preemption concerns.175 Since the provisions 
could be implemented in a manner that would not interfere or be federally preempt, the provision 
remains constitutional unless its implementation differs from its facial constitutionality. For the 
Court, the enjoining of the provision occurred too early, as the provision had yet to be 
implemented and practice had yet to determine whether the provision would interfere with 
federal objectives.   
Without evidence, of either by interfering in a field secured exclusively through the 
federal government or by providing an obstacle or conflict for federal law, Provision 2(B) must 
be considered constitutional. As the provision can be read in a constitutional manner, failing to 
interfere with federal objectives, it would be “inappropriate to assume Section 2(B) would be 
preempted by federal law, without the definitive interpretation from the state courts.”176 In 
layman’s terms, the Court determined it was too early to decide whether Section 2(B) is 
unconstitutional or not based on preemption. Although the Court decided that the provision was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Ibid, 21. 
175 Ibid, 22. 
176 Ibid, 24. 
	   51 
constitutional, it placed a “to be determined” pause on its constitutionality investigation, to be 
resolved in the future with the assistance of the interpretation of the state courts.177  
While understanding the plight and frustrations of Arizona, the court expresses that “the 
State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law.”178 As a pivotal decision in 
determining the trajectory of the trend of state activism in immigration policy, the Court’s 
decision critically asserts the power of the federal government in immigration policy but fails to 
rule the attrition through enforcement doctrine unconstitutional. By allowing provision 2(B) to 
temporarily stand, the Court allows the attrition through enforcement doctrine to stand, but only 
as long as its implementation remains as constitutional as the face of the statutes. Significant for 
the potential trajectory of the state attrition through enforcement policies, the decision grants 
states tentative permission, warning further questioning if implemented in a manner inconsistent 
with its constitutional text. 
Notable components of the dissent 	  Justice Samuel Alito, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas all issued 
separate concurring and dissenting opinions expressing their disagreement with both the decision 
and the legal rationale of the Court. Justice Alito argued for deeming all the provisions 
constitutional other than Section 3, claiming that the Court gave “short shrift to our presumption 
against pre-emption.”179 In contrast, both Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia contended that the 
Court ought to have deemed all the provisions constitutional based on a lack of conflict with 
federal law and the authority of state sovereignty.180 181 In an adamant lone dissent, Justice Scalia 	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argues that Arizona’s legislation conforms to federal law, choosing to “enforce those restrictions 
more effectively.”182 Scalia laments the Court’s decision, claiming that its effect would limit 
states’ ability to remedy the negative consequences of the federal government’s lenient 
immigration policy enforcement.183 Yet this advocacy of state ability to employ the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine failed to be persuasive to the majority of the Court. Rather, the 
Court only granted the states cautionary permission to implement one element of the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine. 
 Significance of the decision 
 While the Court did not endorse the attrition through enforcement doctrine, provision 
2(B) passed preemption tests narrowly due to a need for additional interpretation following 
implementation. The decision’s significance lies in the preemption test it creates that permits 
provision 2(B), and thus a crucial part of the attrition through enforcement doctrine, to stand. 
This interpretation could allow other similar provisions to stand, thereby failing to completely 
repudiate the states’ attrition through enforcement doctrine. 
 The preemption questions raised by Arizona’s SB1070 are not unique, as the Court has 
addressed similar questions before. Yet the decision of Arizona v. United States 132 S. Ct. 2492 
uniquely chooses a course for the interpretation of state attrition through enforcement 
immigration policies. The Court chose this course by addressing the gap left by the Court in the 
precedents set by Hines and DeCanas. Arizona advocated for the federal government’s authority, 
rejecting Arizona’s arguments of inherent authority and mirror theory. The Court’s decision 
grants the federal government dominating power over immigration policies, including those 
regarding unauthorized aliens’ relationship to their state. Upon the decision of the Court, the 	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constitutionality of the attrition through enforcement doctrine remains contested based on the 
temporary approval given to Arizona’s SB1070’s Provision 2(B). The question then left to 
interpretation becomes whether the Court’s decision to temporarily approve the provision’s 
constitutionality serves as a partial endorsement of the attrition through enforcement doctrine. 
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Chapter 4: 
Who Won?: The Battle over the Arizona v. United States Interpretation  
 
Upon the announcement of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States, 
both parties claimed victory. In an opinion that promoted the power of the federal government to 
regulate and supervise immigration, how could state actors consider the same rationale 
supportive to state authority? Arizona v. United States’ importance emanates from its decisive 
role as the fulcrum in the trend toward state immigration policies. By determining the 
constitutionality of state policies aimed at deterring unauthorized immigrants via attrition 
through enforcement, Arizona v. United States had the potential to shift the trajectory of state 
immigration activism. How then could the decision of a critical case on the constitutionality of 
the attrition through enforcement doctrine result in such an ambiguous victor? As both parties 
claimed victory, questions arose as to how the decision of the Court in Arizona v. United States 
ought to be interpreted. Which party truly was victorious? 
 This chapter will focus on two distinct interpretations of the Court’s decision that led 
both parties to claim victory. Although the decision seems ambiguous based upon the conflicting 
interpretations, this analysis will clearly illustrate how the decision grants the federal government 
primacy in immigration enforcement. If an analysis of the decision clearly indicates that the 
federal government is victorious, how can Arizona purport success?  The chapter will then 
explore the counterargument that the decision resulted in a victory for states’ use of the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine. This analysis of the states’ victory rationale reveals that the key 
component of the attrition through enforcement doctrine is the power of Provision 2(B) to invoke 
the fear of identification and deportation.184  
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While three of the four provisions failed constitutionality based on federal preemption, 
states perceive the Court’s holding on the Provision 2(B) provision as upholding the 
constitutionality of the attrition through enforcement doctrine. Emphasis on Provision 2(B) as the 
heart of the attrition through enforcement doctrine raises questions about what component of the 
provision proves to be fundamental to the doctrine. By understanding Provision 2(B)’s role in 
attrition through enforcement implementation, it becomes clear that at the heart of both the 
provision and the doctrine lies the intention to invoke fear of identification and deportation in 
unauthorized immigrants to deter them from the state. In upholding this provision, the Court 
upheld the core of the attrition through enforcement doctrine. Although the Court favored the 
federal government in its decision, allowing Provision 2(B) to remain valid allows questions of 
attrition through enforcement’s constitutionality to persist. While the decision on Arizona SB 
1070’s constitutionality is clear, the constitutionality of the attrition through enforcement 
doctrine employed by the state immigration policy trend remains somewhat ambiguous. 
Both Parties Claimed Victory  
 With the announcement of the Court’s majority decision in Arizona v. United States, both 
parties interpreted the holding as a promotion of their authority over immigration policies and 
enforcement. Arizona Governor Jan Brewer considered the ruling a victory for the rule of law as 
“all Americans who believe in the inherent right and responsibility of states to defend their 
citizens.”185 As Arizona claims Provision 2(B) as the “heart of the bill,” its constitutionality 
signifies a major success.186 For proponents of these efforts in state legislation, the ruling served 
as authorization to continue. According to Kris Kobach, a primary author of Arizona’s SB 1070 
and similar omnibus legislation in Alabama, the ruling ought to be considered a “qualified 	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victory.” 187 Even though the Court struck down three provisions, its permission for Provision 
2(B) can be considered a crucial success for attrition through enforcement advocates.188 
 Other states propelling the trend of restrictive state immigration policies also deemed the 
decision a victory.189 Alabama, which enacted the similar HB 56 just a year after SB 1070, also 
claimed victory.190 Alabama’s House majority leader, Republican Rep. Micky Hammon, 
expressed confidence that the ruling would serve as precedent to uphold Alabama legislation as 
the "‘real teeth of Arizona's law’ survived, meaning [Arizona’s] law, and others like it, should be 
just fine.”191 For other state actors, such as Pennsylvania State Representative Daryl Metcalfe, 
“the decision reaffirms our position that we do have a place in this debate.”192 For state leaders, 
the decision failed to reprimand states for overreaching state authority on a federal issue. Instead, 
advocates for state immigration policies adopting attrition through enforcement, like Georgia 
Governor Nathan Deal, judged the decision as upholding “the major thrust of our state’s statute, 
that states have the right” to legislate in this arena.193 
 Yet federal advocates claimed a different interpretation of the decision. For many legal 
scholars, policy actors, and advocates of federal authority, “Arizona v. United States is an 
unmistakable affirmation of federal primacy in matters of immigration,” as one legal scholar put 
it.194 Former Governor of Arizona and current Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano 
expressed the decision’s confirmation that “state laws cannot dictate the federal government’s 	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immigration enforcement policies or priorities.”195 Marielena Hincapié, executive director of the 
prominent legal advocacy organization the National Immigration Law Center, argues that the 
decision affirms the constitutionality of a unified immigration policy “rather than having a 
patchwork system of state laws.”196 While the United States and all other parties conceded that 
unauthorized immigration significantly burdens the nation and the states, the decision clearly 
expressed the need for states and localities to work in cooperation with the federal government 
rather than independently.197 Furthermore, advocates for federal primacy on immigration policy 
focus upon the narrow and conditional constitutionality granted to the only permitted provision 
and the potential for the provision’s implementation to be deemed unconstitutional in the 
future.198 While the contention between the parties continued after the decision, according to 
University of Virginia legal scholar David Martin, the “federal side has the better claim to 
success.”199 
In order to resolve this ambiguity surrounding of the Court’s holding, the legal standard 
of the Court established in Arizona must be clearly defined. With a clear definition of the Court’s 
decision, the holding can be applied to both federal and state powers in order to determine to 
whom the Court allocated the greatest authority. The critical significance of the decision relies 
upon the Court’s holding and established standard, which will be applied as the constitutional 
test of the trend of state immigration policies of attrition through enforcement. The decision 
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ruled upon the constitutionality of a trend of instituting laws to incite self-deportation.200 With 
this holding, the Court constrained state authority in immigration policy, expressing that state 
authority is contingent upon cooperation with federal policies, and more importantly on federal 
terms.201 The decision overall expressed federal primacy in immigration enforcement, rejecting 
Arizona’s argument of state authority through sovereignty.202 
United States as Victor Interpretation 
 An analysis of the decision leads many scholars to acknowledge that the Court supported 
federal primacy on immigration policy. Due to the recency of the decision, little has been 
published in response to the decision of the case. However, sufficient evidence shows that the 
majority of the works, over 70 percent, five out of the seven of published academic articles 
within the short timeframe from the decision’s announcement to the present, conclude that the 
Court’s decision expressed a pattern of federal prevalence in terms of immigration policy and 
enforcement.203 The question of the decision’s interpretation focuses solely on the 
constitutionality of 2(B), as the Court unambiguously ruled the other three provisions 
unconstitutional. Justification for this interpretation divides into four rationales. First, the 
decision clearly limited the power of the states in immigration enforcement policy. Second, the 
decision rejects both arguments of inherent authority and mirror theory utilized by Arizona to 
claim these provisions constitutional. Third, the decision rationalized the constitutionality of 
Provision 2(B) upon federal terms, through its feature of cooperating with federal officials. 
Lastly, the federal government prevailed based on the Court’s narrow constitutional 	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interpretation of Provision 2(B) and the Court’s invitation for the provision to be questioned 
later.  
The majority decision severely limited the authority of states to implement and enforce 
immigration policies. The Court rejected the state provisions aiming to replicate the powers of 
the federal government in immigration enforcement.204  According to legal scholar Lucas 
Guttentag and a consensus of scholars, the Court’s rationale “sharply constrain[ed]” state 
authority by “articulat[ing] a strong foundation for federal primacy in immigration enforcement 
and reject[ing] broad theories of state power.”205 SB 1070 and similar laws clearly aim to 
implement restrictionist policies in order to deter unauthorized aliens from the state. Yet, the 
boundaries placed upon state authority with respect to immigration policies clearly limit states 
from pursuing those intentions.206 On the whole, Arizona’s arguments failed to persuade the 
Court to permit states the authority necessary to continue to enact attrition through enforcement 
legislation. 
In Arizona’s defense of SB 1070’s controversial provisions, its argument relied largely 
upon two premises being constitutional, inherent authority and mirror theory.207 Inherent 
authority claims that state and local enforcement hold an “inherent authority,” or an essential 
power, to enforce immigration statutes.208 Mirror theory claims that states may enact provisions 
that mirror federal obligations, simply replicating the federal provision but on the state level.209 
The Court’s rejection of state arguments of inherent authority and the mirror theory define a 
signature feature of the decision. Arizona’s argument that its “inherent authority” to police its 	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borders grants it the ability to establish provisions such as those in SB 1070 expired in the 
decision. According to Yale University legal scholar Lucas Guttentag, the case reasonably may 
read as an inclination of the Court to explicitly favor preemption of sub-federal immigration 
enforcement.210 The decision expressed a “broad discretion” over the substance and manner of 
immigration enforcement for the federal government. Such discretion for the federal government 
cannot be wholly reconciled with the state’s inherent authority or states’ ability to “mirror” 
federal policies. 211 By rejecting this mirror theory, the Court avoided some future state attempts 
to increase their role in immigration policy.212 The decision clearly affirmed the primary role 
held by the federal government in immigration. 213 
The Court based the constitutionality of Provision 2(B), the only narrow success for 
Arizona, on a legal standard that allows state immigration policies, granted the policies operate 
upon federal terms. The case offered a cautionary message to states engaging in immigration 
enforcement to proceed carefully in order to avoid interference with federal policies.214 Justice 
Kennedy expressed that state policies may cooperate with federal policies, yet the cooperation 
must occur on the terms of the federal government. These terms of cooperation illustrate how 
federal discretion supersedes state authority on immigration policies.215 Further, Arizona’s 
rationale implies that any unsolicited cooperation with the federal government may be preempted 
by federal preeminence.216 While states may be able to cooperate with federal officials, Arizona 
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upholds the federal government’s control on immigration policies and the treatment of 
unauthorized immigrants.217  
 While the Court permitted Provision 2(B), legal scholars argue that this decision fails to 
be a victory for Arizona due to the rationale of its constitutionality. Provision 2(B) had yet to be 
implemented by state authorities or lower courts. Thus, because it lacked facial 
unconstitutionality based upon preemption, the Court expressed its inability to strike down the 
provision.218 Law scholars assert, however, that the decision of facial constitutionality constitutes 
only a modest victory for Arizona; The decision’s rationale only narrowly allows the provision 
since the provision could be implemented in a constitutional manner, yet the Court made clear 
that provision may be claimed unconstitutional upon rulings in the future, which the Court 
solicits.219 The Court even invited future cases to bring the provision’s constitutionality into 
question once again, including cases alleging discrimination.220 Even though the Court ruled that 
the provision passed the preemption tests of constitutionality, the approval’s narrowness signifies 
the likely possibility that the Court would later deem the provision unconstitutional. 
Arizona as Victor Interpretation 
 Given the general consensus among legal scholars on the federal victory, how could 
Arizona claim victory? According to states and a minority of legal scholars, states can claim a 
victory for the continuation of the attrition through enforcement doctrine for two reasons. First, 
the decision of the Court recognizes that state intervention in immigration policies and 
enforcement is necessary. Second, the Court permitted the legislation’s paramount provision that 
is central to the attrition through enforcement doctrine. The importance of this provision 
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emanates from the fear it invokes among unauthorized aliens; the fundamental factor in 
promoting attrition or “self-deportation” through enforcement. Thus, Arizona can claim that its 
adopted doctrine of attrition through enforcement persists.  
Even while it emphasized the power of the federal government, Arizona’s decision 
understood that states hold an interest in addressing the effects of immigration within their 
jurisdiction.221 In view of the absence of federal action, some scholars such as Jennifer Chacon, 
assert states’ ability to shape immigration policy above the federal government.222 Acting on 
behalf of their citizens, states ought to be able to yield a certain authority over the issue within 
state its boundaries. The Court’s understanding of the necessity for action in Arizona expresses 
this need for that authority.223 By declining to explicitly prohibit the trend of authority-expanding 
state immigration policies, the Court condones this involvement.224 However, this rationale omits 
the primacy explicitly bestowed to the federal government within Arizona’s decision. While the 
Court recognized the involvement and role of the states, it did so only so far as to articulate the 
foundation of immigration enforcement as federal superiority.225  
Beyond the claim that the decision recognized states’ role in immigration enforcement, 
Provision 2(B)’s survival of federal preemption tests accounts for states claiming victory in the 
case. The most controversial provision in contention prevailed.  This decision set a precedent that 
as long as state immigration verification laws act with federal direction, similar controversial 
provisions will be supported by the Constitution.226 If the discretion to act remains within the 
authority of the federal government, then 2(B) and other “show me your papers” provisions pass 	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preemption tests.227 Provision 2(B)’s constitutionality, while just facial, serves as an endorsement 
of attrition through enforcement doctrine for its proponents.228 Nonetheless, the Court clearly and 
explicitly placed the future of the attrition through enforcement doctrine at the mercy of 2(B)’s 
implementation. If sufficient evidence, when implemented, points to a contrast with federal 
obligations, then the provision and similar provisions will be deemed unconstitutional. 229 Thus, 
the provision’s constitutionality is far from guaranteed but rather under constant surveillance. 
Even so, states see the failure to strike down Provision 2(B), as a partial acceptance of the 
attrition through enforcement doctrine.230 The core of the attrition through enforcement doctrine 
is the ability of state officials to question the immigration status of any individual, for any 
reason, criminal or otherwise, to invoke fear by identification and deportation. Copycat 
legislation concentrated upon emulating Provision 2(B), further evidence of the provision’s 
status as a manifestation of the core component of the attrition through enforcement doctrine. 
The original author of the attrition through enforcement doctrine, Mark Krikorian, claims that the 
real effect of the provision’s use of the doctrine has already occurred; “the exaggeration of its 
effects has already scared illegals from the state, the fear-mongering has served the purposes of 
the bill’s sponsors.”231  
This fear derives from Provision 2(B)’s “reasonable suspicion” standard, which originally 
stirred controversy about SB 1070’s constitutionality based on the possibility of racial 
profiling.232 As an ambiguous standard, it grants discretion to state officials who could certainly 
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fail to follow federal statutes and profile by race.233 This fear of racial profiling results in a fear 
of interacting with state officials simply if the individual is of Latino/a ancestry, regardless of 
citizenship.234 Attrition through enforcement occurs when unauthorized immigrants fear that 
their residence in a state will lead to their deportation, an aim upheld in the constitutionality of 
Provision 2(B).  The tentative upholding of 2(B)’s constitutionality allowed Arizona to claim that 
the decision favored its arguments. However, in actuality, the Court upheld the attrition through 
enforcement doctrine with a warning. By only deeming it constitutional on its face, it remains to 
be seen whether its implementation will remain constitutional.  
For now, so long as a law does not impede upon federal procedures, then a law intending 
to deter unauthorized immigrants from state boundaries remains constitutional.235 An 
implementation of the law consistent with federal and state statutes on conduct between the state 
and its residents will continue to be considered constitutional.236 Yet, this includes abiding by 
racial and ethnic protections against discrimination, which opponents of the law have long 
claimed cannot be distinguished from the implementation of attrition through enforcement.237 
Reasonable suspicion on unauthorized status must be based on a factor distinct from race and 
ethnicity and many opponents of the law claim that there are not many instances where this can 
occur.238 How can immigration status be indicated without documentation and without 
consideration of race/ethnicity? Supporters of the law cite suspicious behavior as qualifying 	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“reasonable suspicion” due to as an unauthorized person’s fear of deportation.239 What is clear is 
that the execution of the reasonable suspicion component of the provision remains ambiguous, 
and thus may be founded unconstitutional. If the implementation of 2(B) results in a contrast 
with federal authorities and policies, including those of anti-discrimination, then the doctrine will 
lose its constitutional permission.240 Allowing states to utilize the core of the attrition through 
enforcement doctrine temporarily does not constitute an endorsement. Rather, the Court’s 
acceptance of the attrition through enforcement doctrine may prove to be tentative, as its survival 
will likely instigate an upsurge of legal challenges.241  
This temporary victory pales in comparison to the victory of the federal government via 
the significance of the decision’s rationale. In essence, the decision placed a “giant stop sign for 
other states” attempting the enactment of similar legislation.242 Arizona illustrates how 
enforcement actions fail to be permissible based on the will of the federal government on 
immigration issues.243 The complexities and importance of immigration law require federal 
discretion and overriding control according to the Court’s decision.244 The majority of 
interpretations see the overarching theme of the decision as an articulation of federal primacy.245 
A principle significant to the decision places federal policy as the final judge of immigration 
policy, superseding state authority in enforcement even within the state’s boundaries.246 As 
University of Virginia legal scholar A. E. Dick Howard articulated in his synopsis of the case, 
“All in all, Arizona v. United States is an unmistakable affirmation of federal primacy in matters 
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of immigration.”247 Despite states’ claims of victory, this interpretation of the decision is 
reinforcing state legislatures’ lack of action both in anticipation and after the announcement of 
the decision. 	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Chapter 5: 
An Inevitable End: The Effect of Arizona’s Decision on the State Immigration Policy Trend of 
Attrition through Enforcement 
 
 The significance of Arizona v. United States derives from its consequences for the trend 
of attrition through enforcement state immigration policies. As a fulcrum for the trend, the 
decision defined the future trajectory of state immigration policies. The chronology of the 
Court’s involvement in the contestation of Arizona SB 1070 demonstrates the Court’s critical 
role, as the trend shifted dramatically upon its involvement. Overall, the chronology makes clear 
that the Supreme Court’s involvement in the constitutional challenge over Arizona SB 1070 
incited the end of the state attrition through enforcement trend.  
Before the Court took the case upon appeal from the Ninth Circuit, state legislatures 
pressed forward with attrition through enforcement policies regardless of lower court injunction 
and enjoinment. Upon the Supreme Court taking the case upon appeal, state legislatures ceased 
all action in the attrition through enforcement trend. No other copycat legislation occurred after 
the Court granted writ of certiorari. The decision of the Court, while it allowed the attrition 
through enforcement doctrine to persist, led to the reversal at the lower court level of many of the 
copycat actions passed by states. Regardless of states’ claims of victory, the Court’s involvement 
in the constitutional contestation of Arizona SB 1070 essentially stalled the state attrition through 
enforcement trend. The decision of the Court, in combination with the Latino influence in the 
2012 Presidential Elections, caused a deterioration of the attrition through enforcement doctrine 
as a tool of state legislatures in addressing unauthorized immigration. The Court’s involvement 
in the case Arizona v. United States, from beginning to end, played a divisive role in the demise 
of the state-level attrition through enforcement doctrine.  
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Figure 3. Chronology of Arizona SB 1070 in terms of Copycat Legislation 
 
Copycat Legislation modeled after Arizona SB 1070 
Initially Arizona SB 1070’s passage in April 2010 inspired copycat legislation that 
accelerated the use of the attrition through enforcement trend in addressing unauthorized 
immigration. Interestingly, most of the copycat legislation passed after Arizona SB 1070’s 
enjoinment on July 6, 2010. Despite the lower court’s enjoinment in 2011, Alabama, Georgia, 
Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah, enacted similar legislation to Arizona SB 1070. These 
contributions to the state attrition through enforcement trend promoted the model established by 
Arizona, furthering the trend of aiming to deter unauthorized immigrants from state borders. For 
the most part, the copycat legislation concentrates upon recreating Arizona SB 1070’s Provisions 
5(C), 6, and most especially 2(B).  
Similar to Arizona SB 1070’s Provision 5(C), On June 9 2011, Alabama House Bill 56 
enacted three provisions addressing employment for unauthorized immigrants. Arizona SB 
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1070’s Provision 5(C) established a criminal penalty for unauthorized immigrants to become 
employed or to seek employment, well after a lower court enjoined Arizona SB 1070’s similar 
provision. This bill included Section 11(A) which created a misdemeanor for unauthorized aliens 
to apply or perform work, Section 16 which prohibited businesses from taking tax deductions for 
wages given to unauthorized immigrants, and Section 17 which created a civil cause of action for 
United States citizens and legal immigrants against employers if lose the individual loses his/her 
job to an unauthorized immigrant.248 All of these provisions, similar to Arizona SB 1070’s 5(C) 
aimed at eliminating the incentive of employment in the state for unauthorized immigrants. 
Alabama HB 56 asserted even more state authority than Arizona SB 1070; its provisions went 
farther with the attrition through enforcement theory than Arizona SB 1070.  
On May 10, 2011, Indiana enacted Senate Bill 590, which mimicked Arizona SB 1070’s 
Provision 6, aimed at deterring unauthorized immigration by allowing state officials to make 
warrantless arrests of presumed unauthorized immigrants who commit crimes that may be 
grounds for deportation. Indiana SB 590 Section 20 allowed state officers to make arrests if state 
officials obtained probable cause to believe person had been indicted or convicted of aggravated 
felony.249 As similar provisions, both aim at deterring unauthorized immigrants by invoking a 
fear of a warrantless arrest. None of the other copycat legislation from Alabama, Georgia, South 
Carolina, and Utah utilized this same criminality in order to deter unauthorized immigrants from 
the state. Rather copycat legislation significantly concentrated upon mimicking Arizona SB 
1070’s Provision 2(B).  
As further evidence of Provision 2(B)’s role as the heart of the attrition through 
enforcement doctrine, the majority of copycat legislation concentrated upon mimicking that 	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central component of the trend, Provision 2(B). Arizona SB 1070’s Section 2(B) granted state 
officials the authority, “where reasonable suspicion exists” of an alien status, to determine the 
immigration status of that person.250 Commonly known as a “show me your papers” provision, 
Section 2(B) permitted state officials to seek the immigration status of any individual, thereby 
permitting the active pursuit of unauthorized aliens by state authorities. Indiana, Georgia, South 
Carolina and Utah all enacted copycat provisions to Section 2(B), focusing on the identification 
and detention components the statute.  
The only copycat legislation passed before the Ninth Circuit request of the Arizona case, 
Utah enacted House Bill 497 in March 2011, which requires that a state officer verify the 
immigration status of an arrested, detained, or at a lawful stop.251 While this provision offers less 
latitude for state officials in inquiring about immigration status than Arizona SB 1070’s 
Provision 2(B), Utah HB 497 permits far more authority to state officials than previously held.252 
After the Ninth Circuit’s request, Georgia also enacted a similar provision in its House Bill 87 on 
May 13, 2011, also focusing on employment, law enforcement, and public benefits in an effort to 
promote attrition through enforcement.253 Georgia HB 87 Section 8 mimics Arizona’s Section 
2(B), permitting state officers to verify immigration status on any stop. On June 27, 2011, South 
Carolina enacted their version of state attrition through enforcement legislation, Act 69. Its 
Section 6B(2) reflects Arizona SB 1070’s 2(B) as it allows state officers to verify immigration 
status, yet only upon reasonable suspicion in a criminal offense.254 
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Identification requirements also became a popular aspect of Arizona SB 1070’s Provision 
2(B) that state legislatures mimicked. As a means of verifying immigration status, identification 
documents remain a critical aspect of Provision 2(B). A component of Indiana’s SB 590 included 
a statute that prohibited false identification from being offered, accepted, or recorded as valid 
identification.255  All of the provisions enacted in South Carolina’s Act 69, aforementioned 
Section 6B(2), address identification documents: making the creation or use of false 
identification a criminal offense, creating a misdemeanor for failing to carry certification of alien 
registration, criminalizing offering false picture identification for verification of lawful presence, 
and Section 15, which made it a felony to issue, make, sell, or offer counterfeit or fraudulent 
identification.  
In this way from March of 2011 – June of 2011, five states copied AZ SB 1070, 
accelerating the trend of the state attrition through enforcement. This period before the Court 
granted approval for appellate jurisdiction ought to be considered a time where state legislatures 
furthered the momentum of the Arizona legislation aiming to further deter unauthorized 
immigration.256 After the Court granted approval of the appeal of the Arizona case, state 
legislatures stopped enacting attrition through enforcement legislation. This point in the 
chronology of Arizona SB 1070’s legal challenges marks the end of the momentum for the state 
attrition through enforcement trend.  
Decline in Amount of State Immigration Policies After Decision 
Upon the Court’s grant of writ or certiorari, a clear shift in states’ immigration legislation 
occurred. This shift showcases the influence of the pending Court’s decision on the state attrition 
through enforcement doctrine. In 2012, proposed immigration bills decreased by 44 percent in 	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state legislatures, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.257 This decrease 
occurred in all subjects of legislation such as identification, law enforcement, and 
employment.258 State legislatures became less active and far subtler on anti-immigration 
positions during this period of anticipation.259 Since then, measures akin to SB 1070 have not 
been enacted.260 One would assume that once the Court deemed Provision 2(B) constitutional, 
the trend would narrow its implementation and enact similar provisions that states knew would 
be held constitutional. Interestingly, this tapering of the attrition through enforcement trend did 
not occur. Rather, the decision failed to spur the enactment of provisions similar to Provision 
2(B), although the Court deemed the provision constitutional. The Supreme Court’s public 
reprimand of Arizona’s efforts in its Arizona decision lessened state legislatures commitment to 
the attrition through enforcement strategy. In 2012, no laws passed similar to Arizona SB 
1070.261  
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Figure 4. State Immigration Legislation and Resolutions – Post Court Involvement 
 
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2012 
Instead, state actors wishing to pursue the attrition through enforcement strategy, even 
after the Court’s decision, reallocated efforts to aspects of the relationship between the 
government and unauthorized aliens not addressed in Arizona SB 1070. As the Court prohibited 
establishing criminal actions and forcing unauthorized immigrants to deal with increased 
obstacles, some Republican legislatures allocated their efforts to obstructing legislative efforts to 
provide benefits to unauthorized immigrants.262 If the states could not institute policies to deter 
undocumented aliens, then states focused on preventing incentives for undocumented aliens to 
reside in the state. In Arizona, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, and North Carolina, Governors or 
Department of Motor Vehicle administrators announced that they would no longer issue driver’s 
licenses to unauthorized immigrants. Similar action is under consideration in other states, 
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including Tennessee.263 Yet importantly, much of the momentum for the state attrition through 
enforcement trend transferred to inciting a dialogue for immigration reform at the federal level 
rather than state policies.264  
Effect on SB 1070-like Legislation 
Even the states of copycat legislation have largely tempered their restrictive policies both 
voluntarily and through lower court rulings. Like their model legislation, Arizona SB 1070, 
many of the copycat attrition through enforcement provisions soon were found unconstitutional 
by lower courts. As the attrition through enforcement trend has lost legislative support, the 
doctrine remains active in the courts. The same rationale to block the provision of SB 1070 has 
been employed in decisions on Alabama and Georgia’s laws.265 State legislatures created these 
provisions similar to Arizona SB 1070 in order to deter or punish unauthorized immigrants. 
Following Arizona v. United States, these provisions failed to pass tests of constitutionality based 
on federal preemption.266 These trials for the SB 1070-like laws ought to be understood as 
evidence for states’ inability to circumvent federal authority and continue the strategy of attrition 
through enforcement through this means.267 
On August 20, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions 
on Alabama HB 56. Collectively, the court deemed seven of the originally ten contested 
provisions as unconstitutional. Along with the four previously enjoined provisions, the court 
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struck down an identification provision, which created a misdemeanor for failing to carry alien 
registration documentation. The court also struck down two other provisions that expanded the 
type of polices included in the state attrition through enforcement: trend one which barred courts 
from enforcing contracts with unauthorized aliens, with the exception of federal contracts, and 
the other which required every public school to determine students’ citizenship. Prior to the two 
decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Appeals Court, Alabama voluntarily revised the law, trimming 
some of the anti-immigrant provisions to avoid court injunctions including its provision that 
restricts enrollment in public schools for unauthorized aliens. The court upheld those provisions 
in the same manner as Arizona SB 1070 Section 2(B), as facially constitutional pending 
implementation.268 Yet Arizona’s decision seems to have lessened the zeal of activist states. On 
February 28, 2013, in its appeal of the Eleventh Circuit ruling, Alabama refrained from 
challenging the court’s opinion on its provision restricting unauthorized immigrants from public 
secondary education.269  
On August 20, 2012, in Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights et al. v. Nathan Deal, 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the enjoinment of a provision which criminalizes 
harboring an unauthorized immigrant included in Georgia’s HB 87, but remanded the enjoinment 
of the provision mimicking the Arizona’s SB 1070 Provision 2(B). Akin to Arizona and 
Alabama, the court narrowly upheld those provisions assuming that state officials could 
implement the legislation in a manner that is not preempted by federal law.270 
On March 28, 2013, the judge enjoined Indiana SB 590 Section 18 which prohibited 
consular identification from being offered, accepted, or recorded as valid identification and 
Section 20 which allowed officers to make arrests if immigration courts filed a removal order 	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issued for the individual if the state officials obtained probable cause to believe person has been 
indicted or convicted of aggravated felony.271 As further evidence of the present, there are no 
reports that Indiana intends to appeal the decision of the court.  
  Months after the Arizona v. United States decision, on November 15, 2012, the district 
court dissolved the injunction for South Carolina Act 69 Section 6, other than the section of the 
provision most analogous with Arizona SB 1070’s 2(B), and affirmed the injunction for all the 
other provisions addressing identification.272 Interestingly, South Carolina Act 69’s Section 
6B(2) provided state officials virtually the same authority granted to state officials through 
Arizona SB 1070 Provision 2(B). Thus, this district court ruling leads to the notion that even the 
provisions similar to Arizona SB 1070’s Provision 2(B), deemed constitutional by the Court, will 
soon be deemed unconstitutional. Lastly, On June 28, 2012, the District Court assigned to the 
petition for enjoinment of Utah HB 497, requested that the parties file briefs addressing the 
preemption contentions in response to the Court’s decision in Arizona.273 Since then, little 
judicial action has occurred to continue the petition, as efforts to continue the state attrition 
through enforcement trend seemed moot.  
  With the decision of Arizona v. United States, Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina 
and Utah’s copycat legislation sustained a similar fate to Arizona SB 1070. The courts applied 
the standards established in the case to find that many of the attrition through enforcement 
provisions were federally preempted. Most provisions similar to SB 1070’s Provision 2(B) 
narrowly survived the preemption tests, although South Carolina Act 69’s 6B(2) served as one 
exception. Additionally, state legislatures voluntarily revised many of the contentious provisions, 
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in anticipation of lower courts’ adherence to Arizona’s precedent, which would predictably find 
the copycat provisions to be unconstitutional.  
Future cases alluded to by the Court  
As the Court suggested in its ruling, the implementation of attrition through enforcement 
provisions similar to SB 1070 2(B) remain under legal scrutiny. The continued existence of SB 
1070 Section 2(B) perpetuates the debate on the attrition through enforcement doctrine’s 
constitutionality, leading to new legal challenges as Filindra and Tichenor predicted.274 In 
September of 2012, an Arizona district court formally dismissed the injunction on SB 1070 
Section 2(B), allowing it to be implemented for the first time.275 The ACLU of Arizona has 
received hundreds of reports of state officials abridging fundamental rights in the provision’s 
implementation since its employment, including cases of rights violations against citizens and 
legal residents.276 The ACLU of Arizona, along with other parties, plans to challenge Section 
2(B)’s constitutionality based on invalid implementation, as soon as sufficient evidence has been 
accumulated.277 
In another suit, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the SB 1070 provision 
that criminalized day labor work, ought to remain blocked.278 This ruling further illustrates the 
slow demise of the attrition through enforcement doctrine, as more provisions that utilized its 
core intention fail to be deemed constitutional. Additionally on May 10, 2012, the Department of 
Justice filed suit against Maricopa County, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), and 
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Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio based on unconstitutional and unlawful actions emanating from the 
dominant objective of deterring unauthorized immigrants from Arizona’s borders.279 These cases 
attempt to resolve any ambiguity left by Arizona’s decision. 
Impact of 2012 Presidential Election  
 Similarly, the demonstration of Latino political power in the 2012 presidential election 
contributed to the gradual demise of the state-level attrition through enforcement doctrine. As a 
growing population in the United States, the Latino demographic accounts for 10% of the 
electorate, which notably increases each presidential election term.280 The Latino population 
overwhelmingly voted for President Barack Obama over Republican candidate Mitt Romney, 
71% to 27% respectively.281 The statistical importance of the Latino voting bloc became 
undeniable following the results of the election. This overwhelming Democratic support among 
Latinos can be attributed, at least partly, to the Democratic administration’s response to the 
states’ attrition through enforcement doctrine. Latino voters united in support of President 
Barack Obama, who actively opposed the state attrition through enforcement laws, as well as 
deferred action for undocumented youth.  
According to a 2012 national survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press, supporters and opponents of Arizona SB 1070 break down along clear 
racial/ethnic divisions. Seventy-five percent of Latinos opposed the law, compared to 56% of 
African-Americans and 28% of Whites.282 This racial/ethnic division on Arizona SB 1070 
correlates with the division on presidential preference. In general, Hispanic Arizonians favor the 	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Democratic candidate for president in contrast to White Arizonians. However, this pattern 
significantly increased in the 2012 election. In 2012, following his actions against state 
restrictionist policies and support for deferred action, Obama received 74% of the Hispanic vote, 
while in 2008 he received 56%, which is the exact percentage that Democratic Presidential 
Nominee John Kerry received in the 2004 election.283 Although many factors could have 
contributed to this change, one certainly can argue that the administration’s persistence in 
challenging Arizona’s immigration law and other state attrition through enforcement laws served 
as a major factor in gaining the support of Hispanic voters.284 A majority of Latino voters unified 
in order to reelect the administration that fought against the state attrition through enforcement 
trend, a significant demonstration of the political liability of state attrition through enforcement 
amidst growing Latino political clout.  
Inevitable demise of the States Adoption of the Attrition through Enforcement Doctrine 
 The decision of Arizona v. United States failed to answer all the constitutional questions 
that the attrition through enforcement strategy raised for state immigration policy. The Supreme 
Court’s decision became a fulcrum in the debate on state involvement in immigration policy but 
does not end the trend’s constitutional questions.285 While the federal government emerged as the 
main victor in the decision, the allowance of the most critical provision for the states’ attrition 
through enforcement doctrine offers the states’ argument a temporary lifeline in the debate. Less 
than a year after the decision, courts have successfully challenged attrition through enforcement 
provisions and state legislatures have curtailed their attempts at deterrence. The Court’s decision 
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in Arizona v. United States clearly instigated a trend of explicit federal primacy on immigration 
issues and a slow decline of the attrition through enforcement doctrine at the state level. 
Arizona v. United States articulated the primacy of the federal government in 
immigration policies and enforcement. However temporary its constitutionality, Section 2(B)’s 
acceptance narrowed the questions on the boundaries of state immigration policies, pertaining to 
the attrition through enforcement strategy. The question left by the Court as to whether these 
provisions will be constitutionally enforced has begun to be answered by state legislatures and 
the courts.286 From this trajectory of legal challenges, it seems inevitable that the provision will 
fail constitutional tests based on federal preemption or anti-discrimination law. As the Court 
warned, the unconstitutional implementation of facially constitutional provisions will continue to 
be contested. Despite the Court’s split decision of SB 1070, the trend of state immigration 
policies has already faltered. By ceasing all efforts of persisting the state attrition through 
enforcement trend, state legislatures signal their understanding of the unconstitutionality of the 
trend’s core premise: the ability of states to utilize fear to deter unauthorized immigrants from 
their borders. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Charles, Patrick J. “Weighting the Constitutionality of Immigration Verification Laws in the Wake of Arizona v. 
United States” Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 27, (2013): 1 – 22, 1. 
	   81 
Conclusion: 
The Successful Existence of the State Attrition through Enforcement Trend 
 
Arizona v. United States plays a critical role in the continuing stories of unauthorized 
immigration and the balance of power between states and the federal government. Significantly, 
the gradual demise of the state attrition through enforcement trend began with the Court’s initial 
involvement in the decision when it granted approval for appellate jurisdiction. Following the 
decision, despite the states’ claims of victory, states have curtailed the use of the attrition through 
enforcement strategy.  
The decision of the Court promoted the authority of the federal government in 
immigration enforcement, yet allowed the attrition through enforcement doctrine to continue by 
finding Arizona SB 1070’s 2(B) constitutional. While the Court permitted the doctrine, its 
decision, which cited potential for the provision to be found unconstitutional upon 
implementation, still precipitated the state legislatures’ dissolution of the doctrine. The question 
arises as to whether the attrition through enforcement doctrine could continue to be of interest. 
Upon the analysis of the effect of Arizona v. United States and all components of the case, there 
is no momentum for continuing the state attrition through enforcement trend. Instead, the 
momentum is moving further away from state enforcement, with legal challenges of the state 
attrition through enforcement doctrine, as the Court foresaw. All evidence illustrates that the 
state attrition through enforcement trend both flourished and expired through the role of Arizona 
SB 1070 and its constitutional challenges. 
 As demonstrated in the thesis, states adopted the doctrine of attrition through 
enforcement in order to affect the burdensome issue of unauthorized immigration. Both federal 
legislation creating a financial burden upon the states and federal inaction allowing the 
unauthorized population to grow substantially led the states to utilize the attrition through 
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enforcement doctrine. These motivations created a trend of state attrition through enforcement 
legislation intending to deter unauthorized immigrants from settling. The trend then sprung to the 
national stage through the constitutional questions of federal preemption raised by Arizona SB 
1070. As the vanguard of the state immigration policies using attrition through enforcement, 
Arizona SB 1070’s constitutionally controversial provisions encapsulated the attrition through 
enforcement doctrine.  
Thus, the court’s decision in Arizona v. United States proved to be the fulcrum of the 
state attrition through enforcement trend. The decision resulted in the Court finding three of the 
four provisions unconstitutional, but permitting Section 2(B) to stand. Section 2(B) proved 
central to the attrition through enforcement doctrine in its use of fear to deter unauthorized 
immigrants from settling in the state. In allowing the centerpiece of the state trend to continue, 
the announcement of the Court’s opinion received victorious reactions from both parties; a 
strange result based on a decision that clearly favors the federal government’s authority in 
immigration enforcement. Despite claims of victory, this analysis has shown that upon the 
Courts’ granting writ of certiorari, state legislatures ceased their attrition through enforcement 
efforts and did not resume their following the decision.  
Before the Court’s involvement, other states enacted copycat legislation building on the 
momentum of Arizona SB 1070. After the Court took up the case, the trend ceased to progress, 
only regressing its efforts with revisions to legislation and court decisions. As a fulcrum for the 
trend, the decision defined the future trajectory of state immigration policies. The decision of the 
Court, along with the 2012 presidential election’s demonstration of the political influence of the 
Latino voting bloc, illustrated the challenges of implementing the doctrine through a politically 
feasible means constituent with the Constitution. State legislatures have revised their efforts in 
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addressing unauthorized immigration, utilizing alternative methods even as the attrition through 
enforcement doctrine as adopted by the states remains constitutional on its face. The Court’s 
involvement in the state attrition through enforcement doctrine illustrates the inevitable demise 
of the trend.  
 Upon analyzing the effect of the Court’s involvement in the state attrition through 
enforcement trend, the end of the state trend seems imminent. While tentatively ruled 
constitutional, states have not pursued enacting provisions like Provision 2(B). The state attrition 
through enforcement doctrine failed to attain momentum from the decision and thus inevitably 
will cease to be implemented by state legislatures. With time, legal challenges will likely find 
“show-me-your-papers” implementation unconstitutional and the trend will completely expire.  
 As state attrition through enforcement remains poised for an inevitable and complete fall, 
the question arises as to what will be the effect of the doctrine’s rise and fall for immigration 
reform. Upon the announcement of the decision, both Democratic and Republican legislators 
called for Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform.  House Minority Leader Nancy 
Pelosi stated, “The Supreme Court’s ruling is a clear reminder of the urgent need to enact 
comprehensive immigration reform”.287 Democratic Senator of New York Charles Schumer 
claimed “This decision makes it clear that the only real solution to immigration reform is a 
comprehensive federal law. The decision should importune Republicans and Democrats to work 
together on this issue in a bipartisan way.”288 On the other side of the aisle, Republican Senator 
of Oklahoma Jim Inhofe stated that the ruling “highlights the fact that President Obama has not 
provided leadership in working with Congress to adequately secure our nation’s borders and 	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provide comprehensive immigration reform that is beyond amnesty for those who have broken 
our laws.”289 Additionally, one of the prominent advocates for immigration reform in the 
Republican Party, Republican Senator of Florida Marco Rubio declared that the decision “on 
Arizona’s immigration law is a reminder of Washington’s failure to fix our broken immigration 
system.”290 Certainly, the trend’s existence on the national stage incited fervor for a dialogue on 
immigration reform. 
For the first time in decades, immigration reform seems possible, as the nation 
understands the burden placed upon state governments by the substantial unauthorized 
immigrant population. After Obama’s reelection, attention turned to the momentum toward 
reforming immigration policies. Yet, this momentum suffered a significant obstacle very recently 
with the bombings at the Boston Marathon this April. As the suspects of the act of terrorism were 
both immigrants, one a legal resident and the other recently gaining his citizenship, their act of 
terrorism has incited opposition for granting citizenship to unauthorized immigrants. With fears 
of terrorism, public opinion may move against allowing unauthorized immigrants to remain in 
the country.  
The question now before the nation is whether comprehensive reform remains possible 
despite growing concern about immigrants in the aftermath of the Boston Bombings. The 
momentum created by the demise of the state attrition through enforcement trend, and the 2012 
presidential election, may have been lost with the effect of the Boston Bombings. Regardless of 
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whether immigration reform remains politically feasible, the recent momentum for reform 
suggests possible success in the future.  
The states illuminated the pressing issue of a lack of immigration enforcement and a 
growing problem through the rise of the attrition through enforcement trend, culminating in the 
role of Arizona. Arizona SB 1070 and the Court’s involvement in its constitutional questions 
proved to be the fulcrum of the state attrition through enforcement trend. The Court’s grant of 
writ of certiorari and the subsequent decision in Arizona v. United States incited the demise of 
the state attrition through enforcement trend. This demise only became more evident with the 
political clout the Latino voting bloc demonstrated in the 2012 presidential elections. The state 
attrition through enforcement trend rose and fell through the influence of Arizona SB 1070. Yet, 
this trend of state attrition through enforcement legislation spurred a national conversation that 
may contribute to spurring immigration reform after a decades-long stalemate.   
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